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Abstract
Essays on Speculative Bubbles in Financial Markets
Oswald K. Mungule
2011
The rst essay formulates a dynamic rational contagion model in order to
analyse the evolution of speculative bubbles. The model consists of two laws of
motion: the speculative bubble and the probability of the bubble. The rst essay
shows that the model has two stable equilibria and one unstable equilibrium. The
dynamics of both the nonlinear speculative bubbles and the probability interact to
form two stable equilibria and one unstable equilibrium which lead to ballooning
and busting of the speculative bubbles. These features of speculative bubbles are
driven by the speculators's herd behaviour, the bubbles size, the speed of change,
the strength of infection, and the effects of both the bubbles and the short-term
interest rate on the transition probability.
The second essay extracts speculative bubbles from two nancial markets:
the foreign exchange and the stock markets for South Africa between 1995Q2 and
2008Q4. The second essay uses the no-arbitrage models for the exchange rate and
the stock price. By invoking the rational bubbles theory and using the residuals,
we compute the asset price bubbles using the expectational restriction for rational
bubbles theory. Three robustness checks on the computed bubbles conrm that
speculative bubbles are present in the stock price and the exchange rate. By using
iii
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graphs of speculative bubbles, we show that the speculative bubbles are consistent
with the existence of bubble episodes as documented in the literature.
The third essay formulates a macro-model of a small-open economy in or-
der to investigate the relative performance of optimal monetary policy rules that
respond to speculative bubbles and those that do not. The model consists of two
nonlinear speculative bubbles: the stock price and the exchange rate bubbles. These
speculative bubbles interact with the IS curve, the Phillips curve and the asset prices.
The ndings show that policy rules that respond to speculative bubbles dominate
rules that do not.
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Introduction
1.1 Brief Outline of the Topic
The thesis title constitutes three essays on speculative bubbles in the South African stock
and foreign currency markets during the period of 1995Q2 through 2008Q4. Specically,
the thesis rst formulates a rational contagion analytical framework in order to explain how
speculative bubbles rise and bust in nancial markets. Secondly, the thesis extracts spec-
ulative bubbles from the overall stock market index and a bilateral exchange rate in order
to study time-series properties and understand their nature. Thirdly, the thesis formulates a
macro-model of a small-open economy in order to investigate the relative performance of
optimal monetary policy rules that respond to speculative bubbles and those that do not.
This thesis identies three gaps in the literature. The rst gap is that the existing ra-
tional contagion frameworks that explain why speculative bubbles rise and bust in nancial
markets do not use speculative bubbles and endogenous probability functions. The second
gap is that the existing literature on extraction of speculative bubbles for South Africa do
not use the expectational restriction under rational bubbles theory. The third gap is that the
existing literature for South Africa does not test whether optimal monetary policy rules that
respond to speculative bubbles dominate those that do not.
The thesis addresses the three gaps in three essays. The rst essay addresses the rst
gap by formulating a contagion analytical framework. The essay extends Orlean's (1989)
rational bubbles theoretical framework by using Lux's (1995) pure contagion model. The
1
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essay then extends Lux's (1995) model by using speculative bubbles and the endogenous
probability function from Semmler and Zhang (2007). Filardo (2004) forms the basis
for justifying the use of the speculative bubble as an indicator of investors's responses
to asset price changes. The probability function is used to incorporate transitions from
pessimism to optimism and vice versa into the contagion model (Lux (1995)). The model
has two stable equilibria and one unstable equilibrium. The dynamics of both the non-
linear speculative bubbles and the probability interact to form two stable equilibria and one
unstable equilibrium which lead to ballooning and busting of speculative bubbles. These
dynamics are driven by speculators's herd behaviour, the bubbles size, the speed of change,
the strength of infection, and the effects of both the bubbles and the short term interest rate
on transition probability.
The second essay addresses the second gap by extracting speculative bubbles from
two nancial markets: - the stock and the foreign exchange markets for South Africa be-
tween 1995Q2 and 2008Q4. The second essay uses the no-arbitrage models for the ex-
change rate and the stock price (Gordon (1959, 1962), Isard (2006), Blanchard (2009)).
The essay invokes the rational bubbles theory (Blanchard and Watson (1982)) in order to
use the expectational restriction for computing speculative bubbles. The unit root tests and
the Granger causality tests show that the extracted bubbles are extraneously determined.
The graphical analysis of the speculative bubbles indicate consistency with the existence of
bubbles episodes as documented in the literature. Thus, the presence of speculative bubbles
is an indication that asset prices are disconnected from their fundamental values. Addition-
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ally, autoregression analysis indicates the existence of weak herd behaviour in the nancial
markets for South Africa.
The third essay handles the third gap. The essay formulates a macro-model of a
small-open economy in order to investigate the relative performance of optimal mone-
tary policy rules that respond to speculative bubbles against those that do not. The model
consists of two nonlinear speculative bubbles: the stock price and the exchange rate bub-
bles (Semmler and Zhang (2007)). The speculative bubbles interact with the IS curve, the
Phillips curve (Ball (1998); Svensson (1998)) and the asset prices (Smets (1997); Svensson
(1998); Wu and Xiao (2008)). The essay nds that optimal rules that respond to speculative
bubbles dominate those that do not.
1.2 Motivation of the Study
The study uses the three gaps in the literature as motivation. Firstly, from the theoretical
view, the literature uses contagion models to explain why speculative bubbles balloon and
bust, but it is important to examine their dynamics when these models explicitly use them
as endogenous variables and where the transition probability are a function of both interest
rate and bubbles. Secondly, from the empirics perspective, it is valuable to evaluate spec-
ulative bubbles which are generated by the expectational restriction in the South African
context. Thirdly, from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives, optimal policy rules
for South Africa have concentrated on evaluating responses to overall asset prices, but it is
worthy examining responses to speculative bubbles.
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Speculative bubbles can bust at any time and therefore they need considerable the-
oretical and empirical analyses, required for policy implications. The three questions that
the study seeks to answer include: Firstly, how are speculative bubbles formed and how
do they balloon and bust? Secondly, how can speculative bubbles be identied and ex-
tracted and what are their properties? Thirdly, does responding to speculative bubbles by
the central bank improve macroeconomic stability or not?
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The study has three objectives, which address the above three questions.
1. To explain why speculative bubbles balloon and bust. This objective addresses the
rst question. The aim here is to formally dene speculative bubbles and then derive
factors that drive speculative bubbles in steady state. To do this thesis use the rational
contagion analytical framework.
2. To extract speculative bubbles from the stock price and the bilateral nominal exchange
rate between the United States dollar and the South African rand and study their
nature and properties. This objective addresses the second question. The thesis uses
the expectational restriction under rational bubbles theory for extraction.
3. To investigate whether optimal rules that respond to speculative bubbles dominate
those that do not, in macroeconomic stabilization. The third objective addresses the
third question. The thesis calculates the optimal monetary policy rules and estimate
the variances for real output gap and ination in order to determine which rule
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stabilizes the economy better. The thesis also compares the estimates of the welfare
losses for optimal rules that respond to speculative bubbles and those that do not.
1.4 Contributions of the Study
There are three contributions. The rst essay derives endogenous speculative bubbles and
includes the interest rate in an endogenous transition probability of bubbles in a rational
contagion framework. The second essay extracts speculative bubbles in the South African
stock and foreign exchange markets by using the expectational restriction. In the third
essay, the thesis uses the extracted speculative bubbles in a derived optimal monetary policy
rule and examines whether responding to speculative bubbles dominate those optimal rules
that do not, using South African data.
1.5 Literature Review
Chapter 1 constitutes the rst essay. There are three controversies in interpreting the behav-
ioural view to the existence of speculative bubbles. Orlean (1989), Lux (1995), and Calvo
and Mendoza (1997) provide the rst interpretation which favours using the case of mul-
tiple equilibria, which implies the presence of contagious behaviour among investors . In
the rst interpretation, speculative bubbles are a manifestation of differences in valuations
by optimists and pessimists. Within this group are those who favour using the assumption
of perfectly rational behaviour (Orlean (1989), Dupuy (1989), Banerjee (1992) and those
who prefer the irrational behavioural assumption (Lux (1995), Shiller (2005)). Calvo and
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Mendoza (1997), and Bernanke and Gertler (1999), among others, favour a second interpre-
tation which posits that regulatory changes or economic liberalization lead to behavioural
change among investors. This second interpretation indicates that speculative bubbles are
a clear indication of monetary induced booms such as reductions in interest rates. French
(2009) gives the third interpretation that contagion is transmitted internally by actions of
investors within a market due to increases in money supply and the Austrian malinvestment
theory. In the third interpretation, speculative bubbles are an ultimate manifestation of in-
creases in money supply and malinvestments. This study favours a mixture of the three
interpretations of contagion.
Chapter 2 forms the second essay. The South African literature posits that there
are two main approaches to extracting speculative bubbles. There are those who favour
using the rational bubbles theory on one hand and those who favour using econophysics
theory. Zhou and Sornette (2009) favour the econophysics approach. Those who favour
using the rational bubbles are divided. Yang (2006) uses the value frontier framework to
measure speculative bubbles. Ahmed, Rosser, and Uppal (2010) use a mixture of rational
bubbles and fractal analysis to test for speculative bubbles. There is no evidence that the
expectational restriction has been used for South African data. Global literature that have
applied the expectational restriction include Semmler and Zhang (2007).
Chapter 3, which represents the third essay surveys the global and local literature.
Three distinct notions exist on whether central banks should respond to speculative bubbles
in their conduct of monetary policy or not. Focussing on South African literature, Aron and
Muellbauer (2000), and Malikane and Semmler (2008) favour the rst notion that central
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banks should actively respond to asset prices. On the other hand, Parusel and Viegi (2009)
favour the second notion of a reactive monetary policy response to asset prices. The third
notion that favours an active monetary policy response to speculative bubbles is a new area
for studies on South Africa. However, the key proponents of the third notion include Kent
and Lowe (1997), Filardo (2001, 2004), Genberg (2001), Rudebusch (2005), Kontonikas
and Montagnoli (2006) and Semmler and Zhang (2007). Chapter 3 favours the third notion.
1.6 Analytical Framework/Methodology
Chapter 1 uses the behavioural view in formulating the rational contagion model in order
to explain why speculative bubbles balloon and bust in nancial markets. Chapter 3 em-
ploys the no-arbitrage theoretical framework in formulating a rational bubbles model for
extracting speculative bubbles from the stock price and the exchange rate. Chapter 3 uses
a macro-model of a small-open economy in order to formulate an optimal monetary policy
rule that responds to speculative bubbles. The speculative bubbles, at the Thesis's centre
stage, form the basis for each analytical framework.
Chapter 1 has one theoretical hypothesis which asserts that the stability of speculative
bubbles is determined by herd behaviour, the bubble size, the interest rate, and the prob-
ability of bubbles. Thus, based on the hypothesis, the theoretical method is based on the
application of the pure contagion model to the stability analysis of speculative bubbles. The
rst step is to endogenize the probability function so as to redene the time paths of both
the nonlinear speculative bubbles and the probability function. The study adopts Semmler
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and Zhang (2007) probability function in order to introduce regulatory practice effects on
the time paths of bubbles and their probabilities.
Chapter 2 tests the empirical hypothesis that speculative bubbles do not exist in both
the stock price and the exchange rate in South Africa. The empirical methodology to the
extraction of speculative bubbles uses residual based cointegration to estimate the residuals.
The estimated residuals are used in the expectational restriction to compute the speculative
bubbles. Semi-parametric residuals based tests are compared to parametric tests before ex-
tracting bubbles. The reason for this approach is that speculative bubbles are unobserved
and therefore are part of the error term in a fundamentals asset price model. Speculative
bubbles exist, if cointegration is rejected and vice versa. The standard unit root tests, the
autoregressive order process (Flood and Garber (1980)) and the Granger causality tests
(Granger (1969)) are employed as robustness tests on the extracted speculative bubbles.
Speculative bubbles should be non-stationary in order to pass the rst test of a speculative
bubble. The second check implies that speculative bubbles should have an autoregressive
structure. The third test is that the asset prices should Granger cause their market funda-
mentals, in order for speculative bubbles to exist.
The empirical hypothesis for Chapter 3 asserts that the optimal monetary policy rule
that responds to speculative bubbles dominates the one that does not. The estimation
method begins with determining the parameters of the structural model: one with spec-
ulative bubbles and the other without. The second step computes the parameters in the
optimal monetary policy. Thirdly, the study generates the variances of ination and real
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output gap and the loss function value. Lastly, the study compares which optimal rule
dominates the other.
1.7 Findings of the Study
Chapter 1 shows that in steady state, speculative bubbles can be stable and unstable, driven
by the herd behaviour; bubbles size; the transition probability; the interest rate; the speed
of change and the bubbles sign. The equilibria conditions for speculative bubbles are un-
sustainable leading to balloons and busts.
Chapter 2 nds evidence for the existence of speculative bubbles in the two asset
prices and these results are consistent with the literature (Yang (2006), Zhou and Sornette
(2009), Bond (2010) and Ahmed et al. (2010)). The chapter identies six currency busts
around: 1996Q4, 1998Q4, 2002Q2, 2004Q1, 2006Q1 and 2008Q3 and stock market price
bubble busts around 1996Q4, 1997Q4, 1998Q4, 2001Q3, 2002Q1, 2003Q2 and 2008Q4.
Chapter 3 establishes that, rst, monetary policy should respond to speculative bub-
bles in an aggressive manner. The most responsive of all target variables in the optimal rule
is real output gap followed by ination and real exchange rate. The reaction to speculative
bubbles gives a lower Taylor curve than not responding to them. Therefore, this study is in
favour of those who argue that central banks should respond to speculative bubbles.
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1.8 Limitations of the Study
This study denes speculative bubbles using the expectational restriction, identies and
extracts speculative bubbles using South African data only. This study can be extended by
considering a large number of small-open economies. The empirical analysis in Chapters 2
and 3 can be extended to other trading partner countries and changing the analytical method
to panel data analysis. The idea would be to see which country stabilizes ination and real
output gap variance the most.
The thesis is restricted to the relationship between South Africa and the United States
of America. However, the foreign exchange market can be extended to other trading partner
countries.
1.9 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis consists of the Introduction, three main essays, the Conclusion and Policy Im-
plications. The Introduction presents a summary of the entire proposed study. Chapter 1
presents the rst essay of the Thesis entitled "Formation of Speculative Bubbles in Finan-
cial Markets". Chapter 2 is the second essay entitled "Extraction of Speculative Bubbles
in Financial Markets". Chapter 3 presents the third essay entitled "Monetary Policy and
Speculative Bubbles ". Chapter 4 gives the Conclusion and Policy Implications. Each of
the three essays has its own Reference section and Appendices where applicable.
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Chapter 1
Formation of Speculative Bubbles in Financial
Markets
1.1 Introduction
The essay formulates a dynamic rational contagion framework in order to explain how
speculative bubbles rise and bust in nancial markets. The rational contagion framework
is built around a self-regulating process of infection among rational speculative investors.
The transition probabilities for transiting from optimism to pessimism and vice versa, are
a function of speculative bubbles and the interest rate. Positive speculative bubbles are
indicators of optimistic sentiments while negative speculative bubbles are an indicator of
pessimistic sentiments in the nancial markets. The instability in the speculative bubble is
brought about by excessive herd behaviour. However, when the herd behaviour is very low,
speculative bubbles evolve in a stable manner.
One way of explaining contagion is through the behavioural idea, which posits that
speculative bubbles spread like an infection from one investor or a group of investors to an-
other. However, those who favour this idea are divided. There are three interpretations of
investors' behaviour. Firstly, there are those who believe that contagion can be transmit-
ted when rational investors take actions which lead to excessive co-movements in prices,
independent of fundamentals. In this case, contagion is transmitted internally by actions
of investors within a market due to increases in money supply and the Austrian malinvest-
ment theory (French (2009)). The Austrian theory posits that increases in money supply
lower interest rates below the natural rate and this leads to the malinvestment problem and
speculative bubbles.
Secondly, there are those who favour using the case of multiple equilibria, which im-
plies contagious behaviour among investors (Orlean (1989), Lux (1995), Calvo and Men-
doza (1997)). Within this group are those who favour using the perfectly rational behaviour
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assumption (Orlean (1989); Dupuy (1989); Banerjee (1992)) and those who favour the ir-
rational behaviour assumption (Lux (1995), Shiller (2005)).
Thirdly, there are those who believe that changes in regulatory practices can induce
investors to alter their behaviour after a crisis (Calvo and Mendoza (1997), Bernanke and
Gertler (1999)). In this case, speculative bubbles are the ultimate manifestation of monetary
induced booms such as reduction in interest rates. This study favours a mixture of the
second and the third interpretations. However, from the third interpretation, this study
follows the assumption of perfect rationality.
There are two main steps in formulating the analytical framework. The rst step em-
ploys Orlean (1989) to formalize the denition for speculative bubbles as asset price move-
ments, independent of market fundamentals. The rational bubbles theory, which is founded
on the assumption of perfect rationality is used. The rational bubbles theory posits that
there are two solutions to an asset price namely; the fundamental and the non-fundamental
solutions. The non-fundamental solution is the one which denes the law of motion of
speculative bubbles. An important feature of the non-fundamental solution is that expected
speculative bubbles obey the expectational restriction, which states that the expected spec-
ulative bubbles grow and bust because of the effect of the probability of bubbles emerging,
the growth rate of speculative bubbles, the size of the speculative bubbles and the residuals
from the fundamental solution of the asset pricing model.
The second step extends Orlean (1989) by employing Lux's (1995) pure contagion
model, based on a probabilistic approach, which postulates that probabilities should de-
pend on the actual distribution of speculative bubbles. According to the pure contagion
model, the transition probability is a function of the speculative bubble, which is an indi-
cator of rational herd behaviour. The rst extension to the Lux's (1995) model is to change
the indicator of investors' behaviour by favouring the speculative bubbles. This treatment
of speculative bubbles has support from Minsky (1982), Kindleberger (2000), and Filardo
(2004), who posit that speculative bubbles are an indicator of the behaviour of speculative
investors. The second extension to Lux's (1995) probability postulate is by extending the
probability function to include the interest rate. This adjustment is consistent with Kent
and Lowe (1997) and Semmler and Zhang (2007). Thus, the study uses an endogenized
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probability function, which is a function of speculative bubbles and the interest rate. The
endogenous probability allows macroeconomic factors, such as interest rate, to inuence
the process of opinion formation and therefore have an effect on the dynamics of specula-
tive bubbles.
This study demonstrates that perceived changes in the speculative bubbles to bust
can generate boom-bust cycles and thereby producing asset price movements that can be
periodically stable and unstable. The structure of the probability model explains market
sentiments, whereby speculative bubbles are generated by the interaction of pessimistic
and optimistic speculative investors, indicating their differences in the evaluations of assets.
The analytical framework shows that the law of motion of speculative bubbles is grounded
in the properties of the probability distributions, interactions among speculative investors
who act as infection, which leads to bubbles deviating from their stability paths and causing
macroeconomic instability and poor nancial intermediation. Therefore, asset prices are
inuenced by the strength of infection, the speculative bubbles size, the growth rate and
decrease rate of speculative bubbles, the effects of both the bubbles and the interest rate on
transition probabilities and the sign function of the speculative bubbles.
The rest of this essay is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the contagion ana-
lytical framework. Section 3 provides the stability analysis. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 Contagion Analytical Framework
This section considers an hypothesis that the ballooning and busting of speculative bubbles
is caused by investors' behaviour. This chapter begins with developing a specication for
the speculative bubbles and then link it to a pure contagion analytical framework. The ra-
tional bubbles model provides a formal denition for speculative bubbles for both the stock
price and the exchange rate. We employ Orlean (1989) to explain factors underlying spec-
ulative bubbles. The relationship between speculation and liquidity, as rst discussed in
Keynes (1936), is the starting point to explaining speculative bubbles formation. Specula-
tion and liquidity are two sides of the same coin.
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Speculative markets exist since speculative investors can buy an asset and sell it at
a later date and be able to make a capital gain or loss. As more liquidity is pumped into
the nancial market, speculation becomes stronger. We assume that there are two nan-
cial markets for the stocks and the exchange rate. The economy is described by two
no-arbitrage models: the Gordon model (Gordon (1959, 1962)) as applied in Wu and Xiao
(2008) and the uncovered interest parity as used by Isard (2006). The fundamental value
of the stock price (dt) is the present value (PV) of the future streams of dividends (dt+n)
over its investment horizon. And the fundamental value of the exchange rate is the interest
rate differential

it   ift

, which is equal to the difference between the domestic interest
rate (it) and foreign interest rate

ift

: These fundamental values are updated every time
information becomes available up to innity (Tirole (1985)).
The nancial market model is described by the interaction between the stock price
and the exchange rate, as presented below:
st =
st+T
(1 +Rt+T )
T
+
1X
n=0

dt+n
(1 +Rt+n)
n

(1.1)
et = et+T +

it   ift

(1.2)
where, st denotes nominal stock price at time t; et denotes the nominal exchange rate at
time t; Rt+T and Rt+n denotes time-varying discount rate for equity and T denotes the
terminal time or maturity time, where T > 0. Eqns. (1.1) and (1.2) are evaluations of
the stock price and the exchange rate by speculative investors, respectively. An important
question the thesis raises is how the fundamental values in eqns. (1.1) and (1.2) can be
equal to the price levels. This is possible for the stock price, if the PV of the expected
terminal price is equal to zero and the exchange rate equilibrium is possible, if the forward
premium is equal to the interest rate differential. In these two cases, no speculative bubbles
will exist.
Given that agents are independent and doing their own evaluations of asset prices,
it will not be possible for everyone to arrive at the same evaluations for fundamentals and
asset prices. Arguably, speculative investors prefer to invest in stocks when the PV of
the terminal price is greater than zero, which is in line with the concept of speculation.
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Additionally, speculative investors would prefer to invest in foreign currency when the
forward premium is greater than the interest rate differential. There is no speculation if
either the PV of the terminal stock price is equal to zero or the forward premium is equal
to the interest rate differential. If we assume speculation exists, the stock price will deviate
from its fundamental value and the forward premium will not be equal to the interest rate
differential. This is the well known long-standing difference between the asset price and
its fundamental value which has been traditionally called a "speculative bubble" (Orlean
(1989)). The key question to deal with is whether it is the fundamental solution which
exists or it is the speculative bubble solutions to eqns. (1.1) and (1.2) which exist.
In a nancial market with the interaction of speculative investors, the difference be-
tween the two evaluations in eqns. (1.1) and (1.2) is the nature of information used in
calculating the following two types of expectations:- self-reference and specular expecta-
tions. Self-reference is a process of trying to foresee which average opinion corresponds
to a particular formal structure. Specularity is an essential cause of the disconnection of
prices from objective information. Thus, a link between self-reference and specular expec-
tations exists and therefore the focus is on the nature of the rational behaviour of specula-
tive investors and economic constraints. The main constraints include; transaction costs,
the degree of agent's condence in their individual valuations of the fundamental value and
prices, their willingness to take chances, and the amount of liquidity that they have on hand
for dealing with an unforeseen need to make payments. However, because of human nature
and the presence of constraints, speculative investors are obliged to shift from a behaviour
of enterprise to the one of speculation (Orlean (1989)).
Rational bubbles theory provides a means to explaining the number of particular
solutions which exist in the price evaluation process in eqns. (1.1) and (1.2). The theory
uses rational expectations on the PV of the expected terminal prices as:
st+T = ET 1 (st+T j It+T 1) (1.3)
et+T = Et+T 1 (et+T j At+T 1) (1.4)
where, E denotes the mathematical expectation and I and A are the information sets for
the stock and foreign exchange markets, respectively. Eqns. (1.3) and (1.4) indicate that
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the expected prices are on average equal to the prices that are effectively realized and a
self-fullling condition is by implication recognized in these equilibrium conditions. The
self-fullling prophecy about expected prices does cause speculative bubbles to emerge
even when agents are rational. The differences in the processing of information concerning
future prices leads to differences in evaluations. This leads to a disconnection between asset
prices and their objective information. The disconnection is called speculative bubbles.
It is standard in the literature that speculative bubbles satisfy the following expectational
restriction:
Etbs;t+1 = 
 1bst; with  > 0 (1.5)
Etbe;t+1 = 
 1bet; with  > 0 (1.6)
where,  1 = (1 + Rt) denotes the growth factors and specically Rt = required market
return and it can be positive or negative. This implies that many nancial episodes where
bubbles were observed and interpreted as resulting from irrational behaviour (Shiller (1981,
2005) now can also result from rational behaviour, under rational bubbles theory (see Blan-
chard and Watson (1982)). Eqns. (1.5) and (1.6) show that speculative bubbles are inde-
pendent of the fundamentals and there are possibilities that they can have different forms.
Furthermore, eqns. (1.5) and eqn. (1.6) imply that speculative bubbles generally grow
without any connection to fundamentals and this type of speculative bubble is known as a
deterministic bubble (West (1987)).
Most importantly, one of the motivations for holding a speculative asset experiencing
a price bubble is the expectation that the price will continue to rise. In the case where an
independently and identically distributed (IID) error term also determines the evolution of
the bubble, the bubble would also be driven stochastically by an extraneous factor unrelated
to economic fundamentals. Borrowing from Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Orlean
(1989), one of the different forms for speculative bubbles is:
bj;t+1 =

 1bj;t + "t+1; with probability pj
"t+1; with probability (1  pj)

(1.7)
where, j denotes either s; or e; p is the probability of a speculative bubble increasing and
(1  p) is the probability of the speculative bubble crashing and " is an IID noise term with
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mean zero and constant variance. These bubbles seem more realistic because they can start,
crash and start up again over and over (Blanchard and Watson(1982)). The rational bubble
in eqn. (1.7) obeys the expectational restrictions dened by eqns.(1.5) and (1.6). Eqn. (1.7)
illustrates stochastic speculative bubbles.
The expectational restriction condition shows that speculative bubbles can perfectly
arise as a result of the operators having highly rational attitudes. The most important impli-
cation of the rational bubbles theory is that speculation may not be considered as something
that is necessarily desirable from the economic system's efciency point of view, but that
speculation can lead to a disconnection between asset prices and fundamental values. This
disconnection in turn may lead to a faulty overall allocation of factors of production, what
the Austrian business cycle theory refers to as malinvestment (French (2009)). The exis-
tence of eqns. (1.5) and (1.6) formalizes the disconnection between asset prices and funda-
mental values. Eqns. (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7) describe a process of pure self-validation taking
place independently of fundamentals. This expectational restriction reinforces Keynes's
(1936) long established view which has since dispelled the notion of incompatibility be-
tween rationality and speculative bubbles. Therefore, it is the very rationality of speculative
investors, in their desire to make the best possible use of the market's constraints, that leads
mechanically to the emergence of speculative bubbles (Orlean (1989)).
This thesis has shown that eqn. (1.7) is the mathematical denition of speculative
bubbles. We now formalize eqn. (1.7) into a contagion analytical framework. An economy
is described by two types of rational speculative investors:- the optimists are those with
bullish sentiments and pessimists are those with bearish sentiments about the market price.
Under the assumption of perfect rationality, speculative bubbles are known by speculative
investors. The speculative bubbles (b) are given in eqn. (1.7). It follows that b = 0
corresponds to a situation where the number of optimists is equal to the pessimists. This is
the case of no contagion. Therefore, situations of b ? 0 exhibit more or less predominant
optimism or pessimism. This is the moderate case of contagion. In extreme cases, b = 1
or b =  1: In these cases, all speculative investors would have the same opinion and either
everyone is selling or is buying. In this case, contagion is very strong. This description
implies that speculative bubbles are bounded between 1 and  1. The bounding of the
speculative bubble, is supported by Lux (1995).
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Contagion is the infection of attitudes, with a high portion of optimistic rational spec-
ulators changing the attitudes of the smaller number of pessimistic speculators, and vice
versa. Contagion theory postulates that there exists two types of transition probabilities:
The transition probability from optimism to pessimism
 
 +

and the transition proba-
bility from pessimism to optimism
 
+ 

: In the presence of contagion, both transition
probabilities should depend on the actual level of speculative bubbles;
  + =   + (b) ; + - = + - (b) (1.8)
where, + - implies that speculators are upgrading asset values and   + implies that specu-
lators are downgrading asset values. Thus, + - is the probability that optimists are expect-
ing bubbles to rise and   + is the probability that the optimists are expecting bubbles to
fall. Rational speculative bubbles can rise and burst and therefore they can be positive or
negative (b+; b ) :
Under rational bubbles theory, the evolution of the speculative bubble in period t+1
is determined by the current period bubble, the growth rate of the bubbles and the level
of shocks, given the probability of the bubble increasing (Blanchard and Watson (1982)).
This expectational restriction is shown in eqn. (1.7). By adding the positive and negative
speculative bubble states, gives:
Etbt+1 = 
 1 bt = (1 +Rt)  (bt) (1.9)
Eqn. (1.9) is the mean value equation for the original speculative bubble based on the
expectational restriction. This thesis connes the analysis to mean values in order to
neglect intrinsic dynamics of variances and higher moments. Doing so is sufcient in
order to determine the most probable development from any initial state (Lux (1995)).
Suppressing the time subscripts in eqn. (1.9) transforms the mean-value equation into a
dynamic one for the change in time of the speculative bubble as:
db
dt
= (1 +R)
 
+ - (b)    + (b)

b (1.10)
where,  =
 
+ - (b)    + (b)

: Eqn. (1.10) is consistent with Lux (1995). However, the
dynamics of the speculative bubbles in eqn.(1.10) are determined by their growth rates or
decrease rates (R), the difference between the transition probabilities and the speculative
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bubble size. Thus, all transition probabilities have to be positive by denition; and to grasp
the rational contagion idea, the probability for a transition from pessimistic to optimistic
attitude is assumed to be larger than in the opposite direction if the prevailing disposition
about the asset price is already optimistic. It seems reasonable to assume that the relative
change in the probability to switch from one state to another is determined by the change
in bubbles and the strength of infection (Lux (1995)). Algebraically, this is written as:
d+ -
+ -
= a db;
d  +
  +
=  a db (1.11)
where, eqn.(1.11) implies states that the relative change in the probability to switch from
pessimism to optimism increases linearly with changes in the rational speculative bubble
db; and vice versa; and a is the measure of strength of infection or rational herding behav-
iour (Lux (1995)). These assumptions suggest that the probability switching is determined
by the speed of change (v), strength of infection (a) and the level of bubble (b):
+ - (b) = v(expfabg);   + (b) = v(expf abg) (1.12)
Eqn. (1.12) shows the probability function for optimists and pessimists, respectively.
Eqn.(1.12) allows for switches even in the presence of market efciency (b = 0) since;
+ - =   + = v > 0: This implies that changes in the speculative bubble occurs due to
the differences in information possessed by speculators. Thus, the time development of the
mean-value of the speculative bubbles dened in eqn.(1.10) becomes;
db
dt
= bv(1 +R)(expfabg)  bv(expf abg) (1.13)
Using the De Moivre's theorem, the Euler's eqn. (1.13) is solved for sinh and cosh function
as (Weidlich and Haag (1983)) (see Appendix A.A for derivation);

b = v [2 +R] (b sinh ab  b cosh ab) (1.14)
Eqn. (1.14) uses the standard sine-cosine formula used by Lux (1995) which implies that
the evolution of the time path of the speculative bubbles follows the hyperbolic sine and
cosine. Thus, the time path of the speculative bubbles in eqn.(1.14) can be expressed using
tanh as (Weidlich and Haag (1983)):
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
b = v [2 +R] (b tanh(ab)  b) cosh (ab) (1.15)
Eqn.(1.15) is now the description of a pure rational contagion dynamics (see Appendix
A.A). The outcome of this differential equation is well known from other applications in
Weidlich and Haag (1983) and (Lux, 1995) of the same ideas. Eqn. (1.15) implies that
the time path of the asset bubble depends on the speed of change (v), the bubbles size
(b), strength of infection (a) and the discount rate (R), which is the key determinant of
the growth rate of the speculative bubble. This thesis illustrates the description of pure
rational contagion, in eqn. (1.15) by using Figure 2.1, which gives a basic framework for
the analysis of the effects of rational herd behaviour on transition probabilities, contagion
and stability conditions of speculative bubbles.
Fig. 2.1- Pure Contagion and Stability Conditions
Note: a=0:8



b1

; a=1:2



b2

; a=1:6



b3

Source:Author
Figure 2.1 gives a basic framework for the analysis of rational herd behaviour and it
is based on the equilibrium condition Tanh (ab)= b: To simplify the analysis the literature
sets,v = R = 1 (Lux (1995)). On the vertical axis is the time path bubbles and on the
horizontal axis is the size of the bubble. The stable path is when the herd effect is relatively
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weak, as represented by the

b1graph for a = 0:8. The implication for this is that since
the contagion effect is weak, all deections into one direction will die out in the course of
events and the system will revert to a state of stability after some disturbance. However, if
a > 1, the graphs are depicted by

b2 (for a = 1:2) and

b3 (for a = 1:6), which indicate that
any small deviations from the balanced state is capable of turning a majority of speculators
bullish or bearish through mutual infection. This makes their equilibrium point, (b = 0)
to be unstable. Any deection from it results into a snowball-like cumulative infection
process. These dynamics lead to two stable equilibria, at b < 0 and b > 0. At these
positions the majority of rational speculators will either be in bullish or bearish mood,
respectively, as long as the level of bubble does not increase or fall further. Therefore,
these stable points are not sustainable.
1.3 Stability Analysis
We now extend the above analytical framework by assuming an endogenous probability
function for the speculative bubbles. This thesis denes the behaviour of speculators by us-
ing the probability that speculators put on speculative bubbles. Thus, knowledge about the
law of motion of probability functions helps in understanding the dynamics of speculative
bubbles. Since the concern is with speculative bubbles which are created by the interaction
of optimists and pessimists with asymmetric information, we formalize the steady-state
equilibrium paths for the interaction between the probability function and the speculative
bubbles.
Assuming that the agents' average expected probability of a positive speculative bub-
ble is 0.5, this thesis extends the model by endogenizing the probability function, as sug-
gested by Semmler and Zhang (2007). Because probabilities should be bounded, nonlinear
and asymmetric, we use the bounded probability function: bounded between 0 and 1, non-
linear and asymmetric around 0: Using the primitive function concept and employing the
probability function for optimistic and pessimistic investors in eqn.(1.8), we obtain the fol-
lowing expressions:
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+  (b; r)t+1 =
1
2
(1  tanh (! (bt; rt))) (1.16)
and
 +(b; r)t+1 =
1
2
(1  tanh (# (bt; rt))) (1.17)
where, bt is the level of bubble, rt is a the interest rate. Eqns. (1.16) and (1.17) indicate the
effects of the level of bubble and the interest rate on optimistic and pessimistic sentiments,
respectively. This analytical framework is representative of the mixture of three theoret-
ical sources of speculative bubbles, namely; rational psychology of speculative investors,
represented by the sentiments measures; the perfect rationality of speculative investors rep-
resented by rational expectations; and the regulatory instrument represented by interest
rates. The importance of this specication is that now the endogenous probability function
includes a mixture of all three sources of speculative bubbles. The probability function rep-
resents either optimistic or pessimistic sentiments and it is bounded between 0 and 1 (see
Appendices A.B and A.C for details).
The time path of the level of the bubble can be expressed as the difference between
the asset valuations of the optimists and pessimists. Using eqn.(1.10), the time path of the
level of the bubble is given as:
db
dt
= (1 +R)+ (bt+1; rt+1)   +(bt+1; rt+1) (1.18)
Eqn. (1.18) shows the time path of the level of the bubble, which is still within the pure
contagion analytical framework. Using eqn.(1.15), and substituting for the speculative
bubble term b , which is obtained by dividing the bubble in eqn. (1.7) by the transition
probability to obtain the law of motion for the current measure of the level of the bubble
as:
bt+1 =

t+1
bt + "t+1   "t+1 ! bt = t+1bt+1

: (1.19)
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And ignoring time scripts for the time path equations and substituting b only for the tanh
and cosh terms gives (see Appendix A.D for details);

b =
240@ tanh(cosha  12 (1  tanh (! (b; r)))  (1  tanh (# (b; r)))2)
  cosh
 
1
2
(1  tanh (! (b; r)))  (1  tanh (# (b; r)))2
1A35
(2v +Rv)
 
ab2 2R

(1.20)
Eqn. (1.20) is the steady state of the speculative bubble and follows the denition
of the hyperbolic sine and cosine function. Eqn.(1.20) denes state-dependent speculative
bubbles in steady state.
Assuming that the relative change in the probability to switch from one state to an-
other is determined by the change in speculative bubbles and the strength of infection or
herd behaviour described by (eqn.(1.11)), the transition probability is rewritten as:
+  =
1
a
d+ 
db
;  + =  
1
a
d+ 
db
(1.21)
thus, using eqn.(1.21) the time path of the combined transition probabilities for optimists
and pessimists as the difference between their valuations is:

 = + adb   +adb (1.22)
and the nancial market's time path for the transition probability from optimism to pes-
simism is solved in Appendix A.E as:

 =
1
2
(tanh (3fp(b)  1fo(b) + (4   2) sign(b)r)) adb (1.23)
where, fo(b) and fp(b) are the linex functions for optimists and pessimists, respectively,
dened as:
fo(b) = v [expfabg   ab  1] ; v > 0; a 6= 0 (1.24)
fp(b) = v [expf abg   ab  1] ; v > 0; a 6= 0 (1.25)
where, v scales the function, a determines the asymmetry of the function (see Appendix
A.C, eqn. (A.20)). Eqn.(1.23) denes the steady state probabilities for the nancial mar-
ket, while eqns. (1.24) and (1.25) are consistent with the probability switching eqn. (1.12).
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The speculative bubbles are treated as stochastic and can be positive or zero or negative. In
order to accurately capture the inuence of price changes on opinion formation, we employ
the probability of bubbles. An increase in the probability of the bubbles is an indication
that asset prices are expected to decrease and a decrease in the probability indicates that
asset prices are expected to increase, for positive bubbles. The opposite is the case for neg-
ative bubbles. The probability function therefore guides the herd behaviour of speculative
investors. The steady state price stability equilibrium is determined by (see Appendix A.E
for our solution):
 =

2ab

2 ln a+ 2 ln (+ b  ) + 4 ln v + ln1   ln2   ln3 + ln4
+2 ln sign(b)r

(1.26)
Eqn. (1.26) indicates that in steady state, asset prices can be inuenced by strength of
infection (a), speed of change (v), the bubble size (b), the discount factor (), the effects
of bubbles on the probability switching (1; 3), effects of the interest rates on probability
switching (2; 4) and the sign of bubbles (sign (b)).
Therefore, eqns.(1.20) and (1.23) are plotted in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 using simulated
data, with the +  = 0 curve sloping upwards and the

b = 0 curve being nonlinear. The
vertical axis measures the probability of bubbles while the horizontal axis measure the
bubble sizes. This model is robust in explaining the unstable nature of both deterministic
and collapsible speculative bubbles. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the intertemporal equilibria
at three points of intersection. For example, Figure 2.2 shows the stable bubble path and
the stable probability for optimists.
The

b graph, which describes eqn.(1.20), shows the steady state evolution of the
speculative bubbles when herd behaviour is high, at a = 2. The -graph, which follows
eqn.(1.23), depicts the steady state evolution of the probability of bubbles increasing as
bubble sizes increase. This behaviour is depicted by deterministic bubbles. It should be
noted that the condition for the existence of speculative bubbles equilibria is the same as
in the pure rational contagion case and therefore the stability conditions remain the same.
However, in Figure 2. 2 the unstable equilibrium, where b = 0 is very strong, implying the
presence of strong instability.
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Fig.2.2- Phase Diagram I Fig. 2.3- Phase Diagram II
Source:Author
Figure 2.2 is the phase diagram indicating the steady states for the speculative bub-
bles and the transition probability and assuming v = R = 1: The gure indicates that
speculative bubbles are very unstable and give rise to a possibility of multiple equilibria in
contagion models. The gure reports two stable equilibria and one unstable equilibrium
as shown in Figure 2.3. The vertical axis measures the probability function : The stable
equilibria points are at (-0.78, -0.38) and at (0.62, 0.42) while the unstable point is at (0.10,
0.11). The instabilities in the bubbles are coming from (i) the measure of strength of in-
fection or rational herd behaviour a; (ii) the effects of speculative bubbles and interest rate
on the probability function; (iii) the size of the speculative bubble and (iv) the discount rate
R;or the assets' required rates of return: Thus, if the speculative bubble is between -0.78
and 0.10, it implies that the bubble will adjust towards -0.78 and if on the other hand the
bubble is between 0.10 and 0.62, it will adjust towards the 0.62 stable point. Figure 2.3
shows the arrows, which indicate direction of contagion effects, with implications on the
stability of asset prices. In this analysis, we postulate that the time path of the probability
is a log linear trend and has support from Kent and Lowe (1997).
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1.4 Conclusion
Firstly, the study develops an analytical framework for the dynamics in speculative bubbles,
which have a probability of crashing and regenerating, assuming rational expectations. The
rational contagion analytical framework that is developed in this essay employs a combi-
nation of features from Orlean (1989); Lux (1995); Blanchard and Watson (1982) and
Semmler and Zhang (2007). Therefore, the analytical framework shows that speculative
bubbles are unstable and a permanent feature of asset prices. The instabilities in the specu-
lative bubbles positively depend on the strength of herd behaviour and whether speculative
bubbles are positive or negative. The asset price equilibria when speculative bubbles exist
are not sustainable.
Secondly, by including the interest rate in the probability function, the contagion
model predicts that the effect of monetary policy on herd behaviour depends on the size
and sign of the speculative bubble. For instance, on the one hand, if the bubble is positive,
an increase in the interest rate lowers the probability that the speculative bubble increases
in the next period. On the other hand, if the bubble is negative, an increase in the interest
rate increases the probability that the speculative bubble balloons in the next period.
Lastly, an increase in the strength of infection generates unstable bubbles and there-
fore they can either balloon or collapse rationally in order to adjust the market price. Thus,
this study analyses the rationality of the contagion of opinions in explaining the dynamic
structure of speculative bubbles. The contagion model has all the three features of the ra-
tional behavioural view:- investors' practices, regulatory practices and multiple equilibria
and these modify the Lux (1995) pure contagion model.
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Chapter 2
Extraction of Speculative Bubbles
2.1 Introduction
This essay extracts speculative bubbles from South Africa's overall stock market price in-
dex and a bilateral exchange rate in order to study time-series properties and understand
their nature. Two asset pricing models for the stock price and the exchange rate are esti-
mated and residual-based cointegration tests are rejected thereby indicating the presence of
speculative bubbles. This thesis computes speculative bubbles by using the expectational
restriction-based model (see Semmler and Zhang (2007)). The unit root tests, autoregres-
sive process check and the Granger causality test indicate that the computed asset price
bubbles are extraneously determined. The presence of speculative bubbles in nancial as-
set prices implies that asset prices are disconnected from their fundamental values. When
prices are disconnected from their fundamentals, the perceived changes in speculative bub-
bles to bust can generate boom-bust cycles. The busting of speculative bubbles is normally
followed by a credit crunch and a deterioration of households' and rms' balance sheets
leading to a decline in social welfare. Knowledge about the properties of speculative bub-
bles can help in controlling them and therefore providing a soft landing.
There are several views on how to determine the existence of speculative bubbles
in the literature and more specically for South Africa. On the one hand, there are those
who favour using the rational bubbles theory and on the other hand those who favour using
the econophysics theory (see Bouchand and Potters (2003)). The econophysics approach
posits that searching for fundamentals is irrelevant because of fundamental uncertainty
and it uses high frequency data for prices (Zhou and Sornette (2009)). Those who favour
using the rational bubbles theory employ the fundamental in the asset pricing model, but
are divided. There are those who use the value frontier framework to measure speculative
bubbles (Yang (2006)). Some use rational bubbles theory with fractal analysis (Ahmed et
al. (2010)); such as the Hurst (1951) exponent method (Peters (1994)); the Hamilton (1989)
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regime switching methods and the Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman (1997) independence
tests. Others use the expectational restrictions for speculative bubbles (Semmler and Zhang
(2007)). This study follows the expectational restriction for measuring speculative bubbles
because it has a rich theoretical background (Blanchard and Watson (1982)).
This study employs two empirical models based on the solutions to no-arbitrage con-
ditions for asset pricing under rational bubbles theory (Blackburn and Sola (1996)). The
no-arbitrage condition for the stock pricing model is the Gordon model (Gordon (1959,
1962); Wu and Xiao (2008)) while that for the exchange rate is the uncovered interest par-
ity condition (Isard (2006); Blanchard (2009)). There are two particular solutions to the
no-arbitrage conditions:-the fundamental solution, which exists if bubbles do not exist; and
the non-fundamental solutions. The non-fundamental components are called "speculative
bubbles", which follow the expectational restriction. The expectational restriction implies
that speculative bubbles are extraneously determined. Therefore, any extraction method
that uses the expectational restriction generates speculative bubbles.
The study uses the residual estimates of the fundamental models for both the stock
price and the exchange rate using South African data to compute the speculative bubbles.
A residual based cointegration method detects for the presence of speculative bubbles in
the residuals. The study uses the residual based cointegration method in order to extract
speculative bubbles from the residuals, since bubbles are unobservable in the two empirical
models. The study computes the speculative bubbles for the stock price and the bilateral
exchange rate using the expectational restriction. The expectational restriction is capable
of accurately tracking speculative bubbles episodes using South African data.
The ndings suggest that speculative bubbles exist in the stock price and the bilat-
eral exchange rate between 1995Q2 and 2008Q4. The residual based cointegration test
results indicate that there is no cointegration, which implies the presence of speculative
bubbles. The robustness test for the residual-based cointegration tests also suggest the
presence of speculative bubbles. The results for the robustness of the extracted specula-
tive bubbles using the unit root tests conrm that the extracted bubbles have a unit root
and therefore are speculative bubbles. The autoregressive order process results also con-
rm the results of the unit roots tests on extracted bubbles by indicating that the extracted
bubbles have an autoregressive process of order one (AR(1)). The study uses Granger
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causality test results between the asset price and its fundamental, asset price and the specu-
lative bubble, and the fundamental and the speculative bubble to show that the asset prices
are exogenous in the asset pricing model. The Granger causality tests indicate that asset
prices Granger cause their respective fundamentals, indicating that the extracted bubbles
are speculative bubbles. By plotting graphs for the speculative bubbles, there is evidence
of consistency with the bubbles episodes in the literature. For example, this study identies
six currency busts around: 1996Q4, 1998Q4, 2002Q2, 2004Q1, 2006Q1, and 2008Q3 and
slightly more episodes of stock market bubble busts around: 1996Q4, 1997Q4, 1998Q4,
2001Q3, 2002Q1, 2003Q2 and 2008Q4. These nancial crisis dates mimic both the domes-
tic and international nancial crisis periods, which have been documented in the literature.
The rest of this essay is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the empirical lit-
erature. Section 3 gives an outline of the model. Section 4 gives the methodology and
empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Literature
There are several studies which have identied the presence of speculative bubbles in asset
prices and can be categorized according to three distinctive views. Ahmed, Rosser and Up-
pal (2010) provide empirical evidence of the presence of speculative bubbles in emerging
markets's stock markets, which also include results on South Africa. The estimates cover
the period between early 1990s through 2006 and based on daily returns. They study resid-
uals of Vector Autoregressive-based fundamentals by using the Hamilton regime switch-
ing model (Hamilton (1989)), the rescaled range analysis of Hurst (1951) and the Brock,
Dechert and Scheinkman (1997) test. This methodology is based on the standard approach
to identifying a bubble which is known as the rational bubbles model (Blanchard and Wat-
son (1982)). The empirical method in Ahmed, Rosser and Uppal (2010) uses the stochastic
rational bubbles model which posits that speculative bubbles are present in the residuals.
This standard approach is a method which identies the speculative bubble as an asset price
straying from the fundamental value and the estimated residuals. However, there are prob-
lems with this approach. The rst problem with the standard approach is the identication
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of the fundamental value. The second problem with the standard approach is that the fun-
damental itself may be changing over time and in some complicated fashion (Flood and
Garber (1980)).
Yang (2006) provides empirical evidence about the existence of speculative bubbles
in 37 heterogenous countries, which include South Africa. Yang (2006) develops a value
frontier framework, which is based on the same concept as the standard approach. The
value frontier framework is a method of detecting bubbles based on the "value frontier" con-
cept. The extraction of bubbles rst start with the identication of all known fundamental
determinants of asset prices and then determining the fundamental valuation method. The
regressions of asset prices on the fundamentals picks up the fundamental value with the
least inated asset price as the value frontier. This value frontier is then used as a bench-
mark to measure the deviations of the asset prices relative to the value frontier.
Zhou and Sornette (2009) test 45 indices and common stocks in South Africa and
found evidence for the presence of speculative bubbles. The methodology that they use
posits that it is not possible to know the fundamental value because of the fundamental
uncertainty. The argument is that searching for fundamentals is irrelevant because all that
matters are short-term dynamics at high frequencies. This view is held by developers of the
econophysics approach (Bouchand and Potters (2003)). Zhou and Sornette (2009) dene a
bubble as a faster-than-exponential acceleration with signicant log-periodic oscillations.
They establish that the mini-crash that occurred around mid-June 2006 was only a partial
correction, which resumed into a renewed bubbly acceleration bound which was predicted
to end in 2007. They use a rational expectations model in the presence of noisy imitative
traders. They do not use fundamentals in their regression analysis.
Many studies from developed countries which have provided empirical evidence on
the presence of speculative bubbles in nancial markets exist. The relevant ones to this
study are those which stick to the rational bubbles theory by using the expectational re-
striction which is capable of integrating regulatory practice, perfect rationality and rational
herd behaviour ( Semmler and Zhang (2007)). Semmler and Zhang (2007) specify ex-
tracted speculative bubbles using a modied expectational restriction of the rational bub-
bles theory. The modication allows them to specify a speculative bubble as either positive
or negative. The residuals based test is also used to establish the presence of bubbles and
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to extract them. To our knowledge, no one has applied this approach on the South African
stock and foreign exchange market prices data.
2.3 Outline of the Model
A nancial market is described by two asset pricing models: a stock pricing model and
an exchange rate determination model. I adopt two no-arbitrage asset pricing models: the
Gordon model (Gordon (1959, 1962); Wu and Xiao (2008)) and the uncovered interest rate
parity model (Svensson (1998); Isard (2006); Blanchard (2009)) as shown below;
St =
ST
(1 +Rt)
T
+
1X
n=1

dt+n
(1 +Rt)
n

+ dt (2.27)
et = et+T +

it   ift

(2.28)
where, St is the stock price at time t, ST is the expected terminal stock price at maturity
time T, dt+n is the future stream of dividend payouts for an innitely lived stock, Rt is
an appropriate discount rate at time t, et is the nominal exchange rate at time t (a higher
e implies an appreciation), et+T is the expected exchange rate at maturity date T, it is the
current short-term domestic interest rate and ift is the current short-term foreign interest
rate. Eqns. (2.27) and (2.28) describe that the asset pricing is driven by the no-arbitrage
conditions for the stock market and the foreign exchange markets. Eqn. (2.27) is the Gor-
don model and eqn. (2.28) is the uncovered interest parity condition. The expected terms
in eqns. (2.27) and (2.28) are uncertain conditional terms and they generate speculative
behaviour which leads to the emergence of speculative bubbles.
Under the rational bubbles theoretical framework, which is developed in Blanchard
andWatson (1982), speculative bubbles are the non-fundamental solutions of the asset pric-
ing models. By invoking the rational bubbles theory, the general solutions to eqns. (2.27)
and 2.28) follow solution methods by Wu and Xiao (2008) and Meese (1986), respectively.
The structures of the general solutions are:
St = dt + bst (2.29)
2.3 Outline of the Model 37
et =

it   ift

+ bet (2.30)
where, bst; bet are the speculative bubbles for the stock price and the exchange rate, respec-
tively. Eqns. (2.29) and (2.30) are known as rational bubbles models for the stock price
and the exchange rate, respectively. Eqn. (2.29) is the general solution based on the present
value principle of the Gordon model for stock price valuation. However, eqn. (2.30) is
the general solution for the exchange rate determination, which is based on the uncovered
interest parity condition.
Following Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Meese (1986), the speculative bubbles
are generated by extraneous events or rumours and satisfy the following expectational re-
strictions:
Etbs;t+1 = 
 1bst (2.31)
Etbe;t+1 =  
 1bet (2.32)
where, Et is the expectations operator,  1 and   1 are appropriate growth factors for the
stock price bubble and the exchange rate bubble, respectively. Eqns. (2.31) and (2.32)
are the expectational restriction conditions for stock price bubbles and exchange rate bub-
bles, respectively. Eqns. (2.31) and (2.32) also imply that speculative bubbles can take
on different forms satisfying expectational restrictions such as the West's (1987) collaps-
ing bubbles, the Evans's (1991) periodically collapsing and regenerating bubbles the Diba
and Grossman's (1988) shrinking bubbles and the Semmler and Zhang's (2007) positive
and negative bubbles. The Semmler and Zhang (2007) asset price bubble evolves in the
following manner:
bs;t+1 =

 11 bs;t + ut+1; with probability s
 12 bs;t + ut+1; with probability 1  s

(2.33)
be;t+1 =

  11 be;t + vt+1; with probability e
  12 be;t + vt+1; with probability 1  e

(2.34)
where,  11 = (1 +R1;st) denotes a time varying growth factor for stock bubbles,  
 1
1 =
(1 +R1;et) denotes a time varying growth factor for exchange rate bubbles,  12 = (1 R2;st)
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denotes a time-varying decrease factor for stock bubbles,   12 = (1 R2;e) denotes a time-
varying decrease factor for exchange rate bubbles. R is the gross market return on the
asset and employed as a key determinant of the speculative bubbles growth or decrease rate
(Poterba and Summers (1986)) and Cunado et al. (2005)).  denotes the probability for
the bubble to increase and 1    denotes the probability for the bubble to fall. u and v are
the stochastic error terms which drive the speculative bubbles and are assumed to be driven
stochastically by extraneous factors unrelated to the fundamentals. These error terms are
independently and identically distributed noise terms.
The speculative bubbles in eqns.(2.33) and (2.34) seem very realistic since a positive
bubble would imply an overvaluation of the asset price and a negative bubble would imply
an undervaluation. Thus, the presence of speculative bubbles imply the presence of asset
price misalignments.
One of the most important motivations for holding speculative assets that are expe-
riencing price bubbles is the expectation that the price will continue to rise. The rational
bubbles theory has shown that bubbles can arise as a result of the investors having rational
attitudes (Blanchard and Watson (1982)). The most important contribution of the rational
bubbles theory is that speculation can no longer be considered as something that is neces-
sarily desirable from the economic efciency point of view, but that speculation can lead
to severing of connections between asset prices and fundamental values. This disconnect,
which is formalized in eqns. (2.31) and (2.32), in turn leads to a faulty overall allocation of
factors of production.
Since rational agents know the probability function of a bubble emerging, state-
dependent speculative bubbles can be reformulated from eqns.(2.33) and (2.34) following
Semmler and Zhang (2007). This is done by multiplying the respective probabilities to the
current speculative bubble and summing the two equations. The simplied models for each
asset price bubble is given as:
bs;t+1 =
(1 (1  s) + s2)
12
bs;t + ut+1 (2.35)
and
be;t+1 =
( 1 (1  e) + e 2)
 1 2
be;t + vt+1 (2.36)
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Thus, the evolution of the bubble is determined by the growth factor of the bubble, the
probability of collapse, the decrease factor, the probability of the bubble emerging, the
current bubble and the stochastic disturbance term, which captures all other factors. This
study employs these bubbles because they can interchange their states from being positive
to being negative.
To test for speculative bubbles, the study employs empirical models based on Wu and
Xiao (2008) and Isard (2006) stock price and exchange rate models, respectively, and using
the following regressions:
St = 1 + 2dt + ut (2.37)
et = f1 + f2

it   ift

+ vt; (2.38)
where, 1 and 2 are parameters for the stock price regression model and f1and f2 are the
parameters for the exchange rate regression model. ut and vt denote normal error terms
and they include speculative bubbles and risk premia.
Eqn. (2.37) regresses the stock price on the dividends and this implies that the ex-
traction of speculative bubbles from the stock price uses eqn. (2.35). Eqn. (2.38) is the
regression of the nominal exchange rate on the interest rate differential. This thesis extracts
speculative bubbles from the exchange rate by using eqn. (2.36).
2.4 Methodology and Empirical Results
Given the above empirical models, this study tests the null hypothesis that speculative
bubbles do not exist in both the stock price and the exchange rate. This thesis employs
the bilateral exchange rate between the United States dollar and the South African Rand,
to capture the effects of the dollar denominated global trade on the Rand. In this case, the
United States dollar is used a convertable vehicle currency for world trade. An increase in
the exchange rate implies an appreciation and a decrease is a depreciation.
Equations (2.37) and (2.38) are the empirical models for this study. Firstly, this thesis
tests for the presence of speculative bubbles in both the foreign exchange and the stock mar-
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kets using residual based cointegration approach. The study uses the Phillips and Ouliaris
(1991) and the Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration tests. These types of tests have less
chance of rejecting cointegration when there is one and accepting cointegration when there
is none. These tests consider the null hypothesis of no cointegration. By treating the bubble
as a unit root process, they test the null hypothesis that the asset price contains a unit root.
The existence of bubbles is done by testing for unit roots on the residuals from the cointe-
grating regression. If there are unit roots, then the speculative bubbles exist and if there are
no unit roots then the speculative bubbles do not exist. The justication for this method is
that, since bubbles are unobservable, they are captured in the residuals which tend to drift
apart persistently. This type of bubbles are non-stationary. Cointegration analysis helps es-
tablish whether bubbles are stable or are unstable. Unstable bubbles are generated when
the cointegration test fails and stable bubbles are present when a cointegrating relationship
exists.
We check for robustness of these results by using the traditional approach, such as the
Johansen (1991) cointegration test. Secondly, we use the expectational restriction condi-
tion to compute the speculative bubbles. This rational bubbles theory property admits time
varying asset returns as discount rates. The time varying discount rates can be positive
or negative and therefore the speculative bubbles resemble that specied by Semmler and
Zhang (2007). Thirdly, we carry out three robustness tests on the extracted bubbles as fur-
ther justications for maintaining that the extracted bubbles are speculative bubbles. The
three robustness tests are the "standard " unit root tests, the autoregressive order process
(AR(p)), and the Granger Causality test. Fourthly, we graph the extracted speculative bub-
bles to identify bubble episodes which are consistent with the literature (Reinhart and Ro-
goff (2009); Zhou and Sornette (2009); Bond (2010)).
This thesis conducts unit roots test to determine the stationarity of the stock price
index, the dividends, the bilateral nominal exchange rate, and discount rates for South
Africa and United States using the standard Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) test, the
Phillips and Perron (1988) test and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992)
test.
We simulate the speculative bubbles using eqns. (2.35) and (2.36) using the proba-
bility of the bubble of 0.5, also used by Semmler and Zhang (2007). The justication is
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that because bubbles are linked to residuals, which can either be positive or negative, the
probability of the residual being either positive or negative is 0.5. Assuming that the spec-
ulative bubble starts at zero, then the expected speculative bubble in the next period is the
outcome of the residual corresponding to that period and it can be either positive or nega-
tive. Since little is known about the sign of the noise in the asset pricing model, speculative
investors then may expect it to be positive or negative with an equal probability of 0.5.
This study's empirical methodology is designed to overcome the identication prob-
lem for bubble phenomena, which is related to the problem of distinguishing any type of
bubble from an expected future change in market fundamentals and the detection problem
associated detecting a periodically collapsing bubble when the residuals of the fundamen-
tals regression are integrated (Blackburn and Sola (1996), Wu and Xiao (2008)).
2.4.1 Data Description
This thesis estimates asset pricing models using the quarterly data for South Africa and
the United States of America between 1995Q2 and 2008Q4 sourced from the International
Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics data base, International Monetary Fund
Web Site at Wits University Library and from the McGregor BFA data buffet web site at
the University of Cape Town Library. The main variables for the data collection are the
gross domestic product; Johannesburg Stock Exchange all share index; dividends, domes-
tic short-term interest rate, the United States of America short-term interest rate, and the
bilateral nominal exchange rate of the United States of America dollar per South African
Rand.
2.4.2 Discussion of Results
This paper employs two formal tests for the stationarity of key variables. The two types
of tests test the null hypothesis that the series have a unit root. Thus, rejecting the null
hypothesis of a unit root would mean that the series does not have a unit root (i.e. a series
is stationary).
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Table 2.1. Unit Root Tests: 1995Q2-2008Q4
Variables ADF Test PP Test Decision:
Level 1st Diff 2nd Diff Level 1st Diff Integration
Interest rate-SA -1.48 -5.86** -1.48 -5.80** I(1)
Nominal exchange rate -0.15 -6.28** -2.34 -6.33** I(1)
Stock price index -2.31 -5.31** -0.73 -5.41** I(1)
Stocks dividends 6.79 0.17 -6.49** 6.74 -3.77** I(2)
Interest rate-US -1.51 -2.37 -7.66** -1.47 -2.41** I(2)
Note: 1%(**), 5%(*) and at10%(***) levels of signicance.
Source:Author
Table 2.2. Residual-Based Co-integration Tests
Residuals Tests Exchange rate Stock Price
Value Prob.* Value Prob.*
Phillips-Ouliaris tau-statistic -2.70 0.40 -2.33 0.37
Phillips-Ouliaris z-statistic -11.81 0.45 -12.46 0.20
Engle-Granger tau-statistic -2.73 0.38 -2.23 0.42
Engle-Granger z-statistic -12.21 0.42 -11.59 0.24
*Mackinnon (1996) p-values
Source:Author
Table 2.1 shows that the exchange rate and the stock price are integrated of order
one, implying that they have a unit root. This result justies the use of a cointegration
test (Engel and Granger (1987)). The United States short-term interest rate is integrated
of order two (I (2)) while the South African short-term rate is integrated of order one (I
(1)). The dividends per share is integrated of order two (I(2)). The I (1) and I (2) variables
enter the cointegrating regression in levels and rst difference, respectively. All the unit
root tests are rejected at 1% level of signicance.
This thesis provides residual-based cointegration results in Table 2.2. Table 2.2 in-
dicates the Phillips and Ouliaris (1991) and the Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration
tests results for the exchange rate model. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is not
rejected. This implies that the speculative bubbles exist in the bilateral exchange rate of
the US dollar per South African rand. Table 2.2 also indicates the Phillips-Ouliaris and the
Engle-Granger cointegration test for the stock price model with only the dividends as a fun-
damental. The null hypothesis for the cointegration test cannot be rejected. The rejection
of cointegration implies the presence of stock price bubbles.
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Table 2.3. Johansen Co-integration Tests: Asset Pricing Models
Trace Statistics
1). Exchange Rate
Hypothesized Trace Critical Values
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic 5% 1%
None 0.16 13.28 15.41 20.04
At most 1 0.08 4.08 3.76 6.65
2). Stock Price
None 0.14 8.12 15.41 20.04
At most 1 0.0007 0.04 3.76 6.65
Maximum Eigenvalue Statistics
3). Exchange Rate
Hypothesized Max-Eigen Critical Values
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic 5% 1%
None 0.16 9.20 14.07 18.63
At most 1 0.08 4.08 3.76 6.65
4). Stock Price
None 0.14 8.08 14.07 18.63
At most 1 0.0007 0.04 3.76 6.65
Source:Author
Traditional cointegration tests results are given in Table 2.3 as a robustness check
on the residual based cointegration tests. Table 2.3 indicates two blocks for the Johansen
(1988, 1991) cointegration test for both the exchange rate and the stock price models (Jo-
hansen and Juselius (1990)). The rst block shows trace statistics as measures for the
number of cointegrating vectors and the second block shows the maximum eigen value
statistics. Both the trace and the maximum eigen value statistics indicate that there is no
cointegrating relationship between the bilateral nominal exchange rate and the interest rate
differential, on one hand, and between the stock price and the dividends on the other hand.
These results are consistent with the residual based cointegration tests, which show that
there is no long-run relationship between asset prices and their fundamentals. Therefore,
there is evidence that speculative bubbles exist.
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Fig.3.1- Foreign Exchange Market Bubbles
Source:Author
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the extracted exchange rate bubble and stock price bubble
indices over time, respectively. Figure 3.1 identies six bubble bust episodes, which coin-
cide with the currency crises periods which have been reported in the literature (Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009); Bond (2010)). The gure shows that the exchange rate bubble is con-
sistent with the following domestic currency crises: 1996, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, and
2008 (Bond (2010)). Specically, the gure indicates an undervaluation episode following
the 1998 Asian nancial crisis and the 2002 South African currency crisis. This is followed
by an episode of positive bubbles between 2004 and 2008Q1. The model shows that the
2006 currency crisis in South Africa led to exchange rate readjustment to equilibrium but
with a bubble bust towards end of rst quarter of 2008 and a reversal by the end of 2008
into a positive bubble episode.
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Fig. 3.2- Stock Market Index Bubbles
Source:Author
Fig. 3.2 identies eight (8) stock bubble burst episodes, which coincide with both do-
mestic and world nancial crisis periods which have been reported in the literature (Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2009); Zhou and Sornette (2009); Bond (2010)). The gure shows that
the stock price bubble is consistent with the following stock bubble crises: 1996, 1997,
1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, and 2008. These episodes coincide with the 1996 Mexican
economic crisis, the 1997-98 Asian and Russian nancial crisis, the 2000- 2001 dot com
bubble, the 2002 South African housing bubble, the 2006-2007 commodity price booms,
the 2007-2008 nancial crisis. The international nancial crises suggest the existence of
contagion or spill over effects to the South African stock market. This has support in Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) who dene markets contagion as signicant increases in cross-market
co-movements.
The ratios of the estimated speculative bubbles to their actual asset prices, in per-
centage, are plotted in Figure 3.3, from which we make several observations. Firstly, it is
evident that the stochastic speculative bubbles for the exchange rate uctuate greatly and
account for a substantial portion of the actual bilateral exchange rate in the sample, espe-
cially during the currency crisis periods. Secondly, compared to their mean estimates in
Figure 4, the exchange rate bubbles are found to be signicantly negative at 1% level in
1998, 2002 and 2008Q3 when the Rand depreciated greatly. The results suggest that be-
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tween 20% and 60% of the actual exchange rate during these periods might have been
caused by speculative bubbles. The study nds that the composition of exchange rate bub-
bles in the exchange rate is in line with those of Wu (1995).
Fig. 3.3- Bubbles to Asset Price Ratios
(Note: b-S ratio denotes stock bubble to price ratio; b-e ratio denotes exchange rate bubble to exchange rate ratio)
Source:Author
Thirdly, it is also evident that the stochastic speculative bubbles for the stock price
uctuate greatly and account for a substantial portion of the actual stock price in the sample,
especially during the 1996 Mexican crisis, the 1998 Asian and Russian nancial crises, the
2000-01 dot.com nancial bubble, and the recent 2008 nancial crisis as shown in Figure
3.2. Secondly, compared to their mean estimates in Figure 3.5, the stock price bubbles
are found to be signicantly positive at 5% level over the nancial boom-bust periods of
the sample period. The results suggest that between 20% and 40% of the actual stock
price during the boom-bust periods might have been caused by speculative bubbles. The
composition of stock price bubbles in the stock price is also in line with those of Wu (1997).
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the statistics for both the exchange rate bubbles and the
stock price bubbles, respectively. The statistics are statistically signicant as shown in the
two gures. This thesis concludes that the extracted speculative bubbles are non-normal
and with fat tails in their empirical distributions as indicated by the kurtosis.
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Fig 3.4- Exchange Rate Bubbles
Source:Author
Fig 3.5- Stock Price Bubbles
Source:Author
A check on the autoregressive order p (AR(p)) of the speculative bubbles in levels
employs eqns. (2.35) and (2.36). The AR model results, in Table 2.4, indicate that both
stock price and exchange rate bubbles have a coefcient of less than one indicating that
the herd behaviour is weak. Applying pure contagion equilibrium analysis in Chapter 1,
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weak herd behaviour implies the stability condition holds. The study determines this re-
sult by regressing the expected speculative bubbles on its current value. However, we rst
construct correlograms for speculative bubbles as shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. The opti-
mal lag length is associated to the partial correlation function, before it decays within the
limit bounds. The Q-statistic and the probability indicate the order of the autoregressive
process for each bubble (Enders (2004)). The dotted lines in Figures 3.6 and 3.7, are ap-
proximate two standard error bounds. Thus, autocorrelation outside the bounds implies that
it is signicantly different from zero at 5 % level of signicance. Furthermore, the partial
autocorrelation (PAC) of a pure autoregressive process of order 1, AR (1), cuts off at lag 1.
Therefore, Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show that the speculative bubbles are AR (1).
Fig. 3.6-Stock Bubbles Fig. 3.7- Exchange Rate Bubbles
Source:Author
The AR(1) process for each of the speculative bubbles in eqns (2.35) and (2.36) are
estimated using the ordinary least squares method and the regression results are shown in
Table 2.4. These results conrm the existence of weak herding in both the stock and the
foreign exchange markets for South Africa between 1995Q2 and 2008Q4.
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 indicate serial correlation tests. The serial correlation tests are
insignicant for residuals indicating that the moving average process does not exist. Thus,
the autoregressive process results are consistent the coefcients in Flood and Garber (1980).
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Table 2.4. Results for Autoregressive processes for Bubbles: 1995Q2-2008Q4
AR Model Coefcient se t-stat  R2 log L
bs;t+1 = bsbs;t + ut+1 0.78 0.09 8.55 0.00 0.56 39.9
be;t+1 = bebe;t + vt+1 0.76 0.10 7.89 0.00 0.53 23.8
Note: se= standard error; t-stat= t-statistic, = probability, logL=log likelihood statistic
Source:Author
Fig.3.8-Residuals for bet+1 Fig.3.9- Residuals for bst+1
Source:Author
We carry out further robustness tests on the speculative bubbles. These tests include
unit root tests on the speculative bubbles and Granger causality tests between the asset
prices and fundamentals; asset prices and bubbles; and fundamentals and bubbles. Em-
ploying rational bubbles theory, the generated speculative bubbles should have a unit root.
And employing Engle and Granger (1987), the asset prices should be exogenous to their
market fundamentals for the generated asset price bubbles to be known as speculative bub-
bles. Therefore, the asset price should Granger cause the fundamental.
The validity of the estimated speculative bubbles can be checked by employing the
above stated robustness checks. The question that may be asked is whether the estimated
speculative bubbles contain any information about the behaviour of investors in both the
stock and the foreign currency markets.
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Table 2.5. Speculative Bubbles Properties: 1995Q2-2008Q4
Variables ADF Test PP Test Decision:
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Integration
Exchange rate Bubble -2.44 -7.11** -2.41 -7.11** I(1)
Stock price bubble -2.34 -7.48** -2.40 -7.50** I(1)
Note: 1%(**), 5%(*) and at10%(***) levels of signicance.
Source:Author
Table 2.6. Granger Causality Tests for the Rational Bubbles Models: 1995Q2-2008Q4
lags=2 lags=4
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic F-Statistic
1. Exchange Rate Rational Bubbles Model
BNER does not Granger Cause Interest differential 4.12* L 1.99
Interest differential does not Granger Cause BNER 1.42 L 1.16
Bubble does not Granger Cause interest differential 0.93 L 0.46
Interest differential does not Granger Cause Bubble 1.00 L 0.49
Log BNER does not Granger Cause Bubble 5.37** D 2.72*
Bubble does not Granger Cause log BNER 0.15 D 1.12
2. Stock Price Rational Bubbles Model
Stock price does not Granger Cause Dividends 4.14* L 3.61**
Dividends does not Granger Cause Stock price 0.83 L 1.26
Stock Bubble does not Granger Cause Dividends 5.12** L 3.19*
Dividends does not Granger Cause Stock bubbles 0.71 L 1.07
Stock bubble does not Granger Cause stock price 1.52 L 2.61*
Stock price does not Granger Cause stock bubble 2.92*** L 2.81*
Note: 1%(**), 5%(*) and at10%(***) levels of signicance. Decision: If F-Statistic is signicant, Reject Ho.
Source:Author
Table 2.5 indicates that the exchange rate bubble and the stock price bubble have unit
roots. The null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected in levels for both the speculative
bubbles. Therefore, the study concludes that the extracted asset price bubbles are indeed
speculative bubbles.
Table 2.6 indicates the Granger causality tests (Granger (1969)) for both the foreign
currency market and the overall stock market index for South Africa. The F-statistics are
computed by varying the lag structure. The results indicate that the bilateral nominal ex-
change rate provide statistically signicant information about the forecasted values of both
the interest rate differential and the exchange rate bubbles, given the lag length of two. That
is, the pairwise tests indicate that the bilateral nominal exchange rate Granger causes both
the interest rate differential and the exchange rate bubbles. This implies that the bilateral
nominal exchange rate takes precedence over the interest rate differential in the cointegrat-
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ing regression. The other results for the exchange rate model imply that neither the bilateral
nominal exchange rate bubble nor the interest rate differential Granger causes each other.
This means that neither exchange rate speculative bubbles nor the interest rate differential
includes information about each other. Thus, neither of the two can be used to forecast the
other. The results for the exchange rate model imply that the generated nominal exchange
rate bubbles are indeed extraneously determined and are called speculative bubbles.
Considering the stock pricing model, Table 2.6 also indicates that the stock price
Granger causes the dividends. This implies that the stock price is useful in forecasting
dividends and not the other way round. The results also show that the Granger causality
between the stock price and the stock price bubbles can not be determined. However, the
stock price bubbles Granger causes the dividends. This implies that the stock price bubbles
are used to forecast dividend payouts. The conclusion is that the extracted stock price
bubbles are speculative bubbles.
2.5 Conclusion
This study establishes the presence of speculative bubbles in both the stock price and the
bilateral nominal exchange rate in South Africa between 1995Q2 and 2008Q4. The ex-
tracted speculative bubbles have fat tails in their distributions, and these properties are
similar to their asset prices. The study employs the standard no-arbitrage models to extract
speculative bubbles. The stock price model is the standard present value formula, while
the exchange rate model is the uncovered interest parity condition. By employing a ro-
bust fully modied least squares method, the study shows that the evolution of speculative
bubbles follows a three state process. That is, they can either be negative or positive or
even zero. The tests for the existence of speculative bubbles are done by using two differ-
ent cointegration techniques, namely: Engle and Granger (1987) and Phillips and Ouliaris
(1991) cointegration tests. The post-estimation and post extraction phase uses the unit roots
and the Granger causality tests to justify the that the extracted asset price bubbles are in-
deed speculative bubbles. The basic idea is that if fundamentals Granger cause asset prices,
then the extracted bubbles would not be speculative bubbles. However, speculative bubbles
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can Granger cause fundamental values, as is the case for the stock pricing model. The
autoregressive order process indicates weak herd behaviour in both the stock and foreign
exchange markets, implying stability in speculative bubbles.
The implications of the presence of speculative bubbles is that when bubbles are in
a zero state it implies that the asset price is correctly priced in the market while positive
bubbles means the existence of overvalued asset prices and busts of asset bubbles are a
possibility. But if the asset price bubble is negative, the implication is that nancial assets
are undervalued. The empirical evidence indicates that speculative bubbles exist in South
African nancial markets.
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Chapter 3
Monetary Policy and Speculative Bubbles
3.1 Introduction
Evidence exists which suggest that speculative bubbles grow from time to time and that
such bubbles may cause economic distortions such as nancial and real economic insta-
bilities. Specically, such economic distortions for South Africa are largely attributed to
volatilities in the interest rates, the overall stock market index and the exchange rates,
especially after the liberalisation of nancial markets in 1995. South Africa's relatively
advanced nancial markets and having moved towards ination targeting in 2000, have
attracted scholars in establishing how monetary policy rules, which include asset prices,
perform in stabilizing the economy (Aron and Muellbauer (2000), Malikane and Semmler
(2008)). However, these studies do not separate asset prices into fundamental and non-
fundamental components and therefore the optimal policy response implies reacting to the
overall asset prices, as opposed to reacting separately to each component.
This essay formulates a macro-model of a small-open economy in order to investi-
gate the relative performance of optimal monetary policy rules that respond to speculative
bubbles and those that do not. The study posits that an expected change in the speculative
bubble reects a change in the current asset prices and therefore a change in the expected
real output gap and ination. Stabilization measures for expected ination require the con-
sideration of expected speculative bubbles because they account for changes in the current
asset prices. Since speculative bubbles are asset price movements, independent of funda-
mentals, as long as they can disturbilize current asset prices, they remain a threat to real
economic and consumer price stability. Therefore, they should be incorporated in the cen-
tral bank's reaction function (Kent and Lowe (1997), Filardo (2001, 2004)). However,
economists are divided on whether a central bank should respond to speculative bubbles in
its conduct of monetary policy or not. Three distinct notions exist.
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The rst notion favours the central banks' active response to asset prices. The pro-
ponents of this notion include; Smets (1997), Svensson (1998, 2003), Blanchard (2000),
Cecchetti et al. (2000), Filardo (2000), Aron and Muellbauer (2000), Borio and Lowe
(2002), and Malikane and Semmler (2008). For instance, Borio and Lowe (2002) justify
their notion by arguing that booms and busts in asset prices should be considered as part of
a broader set of symptoms that typically include a build up of debt and high rate of capital
accumulation. Rising asset prices and debt accumulation lead to stretched households and
corporate balance sheets, vulnerable to sharp corrections.
The second notion favours a reactive monetary policy response to asset prices and
proponents include; Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Mishkin (2001), Gilchrist and
Leahy (2002), Parusel and Viegi (2009), among others. They posit that a central bank
dedicated to price stability should pay no attention to asset prices per se, except insofar
as they signal changes to expected ination. The main argument by Bernanke and Gertler
(2001) is that since asset prices tend to exhibit large swings, a policy rule that responds to
them would tend to exhibit large swings in the interest rate. This tends to generate high
volatility in output and ination. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argues that pricking the
perceived speculative bubbles runs the risk of generating nancial panics.
The third notion favours the central bank's reaction to speculative bubbles. Those in
favour include; Kent and Lowe (1997), Filardo (2001, 2004), Genberg (2001), Rudebusch
(2005), Kontonikas andMontagnoli (2006), and Semmler and Zhang (2007), among others.
Their main argument is that central banks should prevent speculative bubbles from busting
by using the preemptive power of short-term nominal interest rate. Under this notion,
the asset price is decomposed into its market fundamental and speculative bubbles and
therefore recognizes the imperfect nature of nancial markets. However, there is a research
gap in South Africa regarding the third notion.
The estimation method has the following steps. Firstly, the paper estimates two struc-
tural systems, one with speculative bubbles and the other without bubbles. The structural
system consists of an IS curve, a Phillips curve, real stock price and bilateral real exchange
rate models. The current real asset prices are determined by current fundamentals and
endogenous expected speculative bubbles. Secondly, the parameters for the optimal mon-
etary policy rule are computed by using the estimated parameters of the structural model.
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Thirdly, the variances for ination and real output gap and the loss function for each of the
two optimal monetary policy rules are generated.
Using South African quarterly time series data between 1995Q2 and 2008Q4, the
study nds that the volatilities of ination and real output gap are lower for an optimal
monetary policy rule that includes speculative bubbles than the one that does not include
them. This implies that the optimal response to both fundamentals and speculative bubbles
dominates the optimal response to fundamentals. This study also nds that the real stock
market price and the bilateral real exchange rate have a smaller impact on real output gap
than the real interest rate. Furthermore, the real output gap accounts for a larger impact
on ination than the change in the real exchange rate. The ndings suggest that mone-
tary authorities should respond to both speculative bubbles and fundamentals aggressively.
These ndings are consistent with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (1999),
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Semmler and Zhang (2007), among others.
The rest of the essay is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an outline of the
model. Section 3 presents the model estimation. Section 4 presents the empirical results.
Section 5 concludes. References and Appendices thereafter.
3.2 Outline of the Model
A small-open economy is described by three sectors of an economy namely, the IS curve;
the Phillips curve; the nancial market represented by the capital market and the foreign
exchange market. This model is consistent with Svensson (1997, 1998, 1999) and Semmler
and Zhang (2007). There are two asset prices: the real stock price and the bilateral real ex-
change rate. The central bank controls the economy through the short-term interest rate as
a policy instrument and follows the Taylor type interest rate rule. The following equations
summarize the structure of our model:
yt = yy (L) yt   yrrt 1   yqqt 1 + ysst 1 + "t (3.39)
t =  (L)t + yyt 1   qqt 1 + t; such that
X
 (L) = 1 (3.40)
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st =  srrt + syyt + sbbs;t+1 (3.41)
qt = qr(rt   rft ) + qbbe;t+1 (3.42)
be;t+1 =

1
2
(1  tanh (! (be;t; rt))) (Re1 +Re2) Re2 + 1

be;t + vt+1 (3.43)
bs;t+1 =

1
2
(1  tanh (# (bs;t; rt))) (Rs1 +Rs2) Rs2 + 1

bs;t + ut+1 (3.44)
where, yt is the real output gap, rt is the real short-term interest rate (i.e. the nominal
short-term rate minus the domestic ination), rft is the real short-term foreign interest rate,
qt is the log of the bilateral real exchange rate dened as the United States dollar per unit
of the South African rand (a higher q means appreciation), st is the log real stock price
level, dt is the log real stock market dividends,  is ination rate, bst; bs;t+1 are the cur-
rent and future nominal stock price bubbles; bet; be;t+1 are the current and future bilateral
nominal exchange rate bubbles, ij are positive coefcients; Rs1 and Re1 are the growth
rates of the stock price bubble and exchange rate bubble, respectively; Rs2 and Re2 are
the decrease rates of the stock price bubble and the exchange rate bubble, respectively.
tanh (! (be;t; rt)) is is the hyperbolic tangent of some probability function ! (see Appen-
dix B.A, eqn. (B.11)). tanh (# (bs;t; rt)) is also the hyperbolic tangent of some probability
function # (see Appendix B.A, eqn. (B.12). These probability functions have been used
in Kent and Lowe (1997) and modied by Semmler and Zhang (2007). The ii (L) func-
tions are standard multiple lag operator functions. The terms "; ; u; and v are white-noise
shocks in their respective models.
Eqn.(3.39) describes a small-open economy's IS-Curve. Real output gap is deter-
mined by lagged real output gap, lagged real interest rate, lagged real exchange rate, and
lagged real stock price and a demand shock, which represents changes in consumer and
business condence. This model extends the Svensson (1998) open economy IS curve by
employing the real stock price. The real interest rate has a negative effect on real output
gap. There is a positive relationship between real output gap and its lags. The real stock
price positively impacts real output via quantity of wealth and investment balance-sheet ef-
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fects (International Monetary Fund (2003)). Real output gap is negatively affected by the
real exchange rate, through a current account channel. Both the real stock price and the
real exchange rate are driven by market fundamentals and non-fundamental components.
The non-fundamental components are known as speculative bubbles, which are asset price
changes, driven independently of their fundamental determinants and can collapse or rise
at any time without any warning.
Eqn.(3.40) is a small-open economy Phillips curve, which follows Ball (1998) and
Svensson (1998:16). Ination is measured by the growth in consumer price index. Thus,
the ination model, which is the aggregate supply curve, is an accelerationist version of
the Phillips curve that has been augmented to positively depend on the inuence of lagged
real output, negatively depends on lagged real exchange rate appreciation/depreciation, and
positively depends on the lagged ination values. The random disturbance term captures
the cost-push shocks to ination.
Eqns.(3.41) and (3.42) represent the dynamic evolution of asset prices;- the real stock
price (st) and the real exchange rate (qt), respectively. These two asset pricing models ex-
tend the Kontonikas and Montagnoli's (2006) asset price model by assigning a hyperbolic
tangent probabilistic structure to the non-fundamental variable, the speculative bubbles.
Both the real stock price and the real exchange rate models depict the actual nancial mar-
ket behaviour where we assume a partial adjustment mechanism, which allows observed
asset prices to be misaligned and therefore prices can move independently of their market
fundamentals. We allow for the asset prices to be determined by the fundamentals and the
speculative bubbles.
From eqn. (3.41) the fundamentals determinants of the real stock price are the real
interest rate (Wu and Xiao (2008)) and the real output gap (Smets (1997)). We use real
output gap instead of the real dividends because according to Smets (1997) the dividends
are proportional to output. The real interest rate has a negative impact on the real stock
price, while the real output gap has a positive impact. The non-fundamental determinant
of the real stock price are the speculative bubbles, which are a solution to the nominal
stock pricing model under rational bubbles theory (Blanchard and Watson (1982)). The
speculative bubbles obey the expectational restriction of the non-fundamental solution and
are extraneously determined by rational bubbles theory.
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The fundamental for the real exchange rate in eqn. (3.42) is the real interest rate dif-
ferential, which is determined from the uncovered real interest rate parity condition. The
real interest rate differential has a positive effect on the real exchange rate. This thesis
augments the uncovered real interest rate parity condition with speculative bubbles in the
exchange rate to illustrate the presence of deviations from interest parity. This model spec-
ication is broader than just augmenting the interest parity with risk premium to indicate
possible deviations from parity, as in Svensson (1998). In this model, the risk premium is
captured in the shocks, which are a part of the speculative bubbles. Thus, by specifying
the asset pricing models with both fundamentals and speculative bubbles, we allow for the
effects of having multiple prices in nancial markets on both real output gap and ination.
Eqns. (3.43) and (3.44) describe the dynamic evolutions of the speculative bubbles
in the nominal stock price and nominal exchange rate, respectively. These models follow
Semmler and Zhang (2007). These speculative bubbles can be positive or negative driven
by the objective probabilities of them rising or busting. This specication implies that
speculative bubbles can occur again and again after it busts. First, Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) and Kent and Lowe (1997) use a bubble which will not occur again after the bust
and second, Blanchard and Watson (1982) employ a bubble which will never be negative.
We use non-stationary bubbles and ones which do not need to increase before exploding.
By implication, asset prices are also non-stationary and highly volatile.
Furthermore, eqns. (3.43) and 3.44) are solutions from some expectational restriction-
conditions of the rational bubbles theory (see Appendix B.A). The bubbles models augment
the speculative bubbles with hyperbolic tangents for some probability function in order to
have a probability that is bounded between 0 and 1 (Semmler and Zhang (2007)). The
growth rates for speculative bubbles can either be negative or positive and therefore we use
the market returns as proxies for the discount rates (Cunado et al. (2005)). Anything that is
not included in the speculative bubbles models but can affect speculative bubbles are cap-
tured by the noise shocks. The difference between eqns. (3.43) and (3.44) and the Semmler
and Zhang (2007) is that this thesis endogenizes the probability function that is augmented
in the speculative bubbles models and we include them in the optimization process. By do-
ing so this thesis allows the current size of the speculative bubble and its growth rate to
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be inuenced by the current interest rate. This makes speculative bubbles to be consistent
with rational expectations (Kent and Lowe (1997)).
The structural model for this study describes the interactions of economic variables
for a small-open economy and can be used to derive an optimal monetary policy rule. In
an economy described by the IS curve, the Phillips curve, and two asset prices augmented
with speculative bubbles, we assume that the monetary authority sets monetary policy by
adjusting the short-term real interest rate. However, in practice, central banks use nominal
interest rates as their policy tool. In this case, given the ination rate, the central bank
is essentially choosing real interest rate when it picks its nominal interest rate. Woodford
(2001) provides explanations for the type of assumptions that would justify using short-
term real interest rate as a sufcient variable to link monetary policy to the macroeconomic
environment via the equilibrium relationship between the IS curve and the Phillips curve
and nancial markets.
The structure of the model implies that at time t, the social planner chooses the in-
terest rate, rt; which affects concurrent real exchange rates, next period's output growth,
which in turn affects stock prices, while contemporaneous ination and real output growth
are predetermined by past decisions, past nominal speculative bubbles and current exoge-
nous shocks. The structure of the model is summarized in eqns.(3.39) through (3.44). This
thesis solves the structural model more compactly in two simultaneous equations repre-
sented by the IS and Phillips curves (See Appendix B.A for the solution):
yt+1 = 't + zt+1 (3.45)
t+1 = kt + t+1 (3.46)
where, 't =  1yt    2rt    3be;t +  4bs;t +  5rft is the control variable of the central
bank as t and yt are predetermined and rt is chosen,  i are the parameters and kt =
 (L)t + yyt   qqt is the state variable at time t.
Assuming that the central bank's intertemporal quadratic loss function L, penalizes
both real output gap and ination volatility, its job is to minimize the loss function:
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min
1
2
Et
1X
t=1
tL;  2 (0; 1) (3.47)
where,
L = 2t + yy
2
t =

kt + t+1
2
+ y ['t + zt+1]
2

(3.48)
Subject to
kt+1 = t+1 + yyt+1   qqt+1 (3.49)
, kt+1 = kt + y't   qqt+1 + t+1 (3.50)
where, the ination coefcient is equal to one,  (L) = 1; t+1 = t+1 + yzt+1 is
a Gaussian process. y2 is the variance of real output gap, 2t is the variance of ina-
tion, y  0 is the penalty on output gap stabilization. 0 <  < 1 is a discount factor.
Eqn. (3.50) indicates the law of motion of the state variable. The implication for hav-
ing eqns.(3.45) and 3.46) is that as both the interest rate and consequently output 't, are
chosen, the only state variable is ination kt: Thus, the value function, V (kt); is the ex-
pected value of the policymaker's loss function if 't+i is set optimally. The value function
is dened in terms of the state variable, kt: We use the Bellman's dynamic programming
principle as an optimization technique. This thesis rst species the value function by us-
ing the two constraints, eqns.(3.45) and (3.46), to obtain eqn. (3.51) (see Appendix B.D for
details).
V (kt) = min
't
Etf1
2

kt + t+1
2
+ y ['t + zt+1]
2

+ V (kt+1)g (3.51)
The rst-order condition that yields the optimal response is given in eqn.(3.52) and its
derivation is shown in Appendix B.D:
y't + yEtV
0  kt + y't   qqt+1 + t+1 = 0 (3.52)
The rst order condition and the envelop theorem allow us to derive the optimal path for
the control variable (see Appendix B.D for details):
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't =  
 
y
y + (y)
2 
!
kt +
 
y
y + (y)
2 
!
Et't+1 (3.53)
Given the linear-quadratic structure of the model, the solution is of the form 't = ckt: The
interest rate, which is set by policy makers, is derived by using the denitions for 't; kt;and
c to obtain the optimal real interest rate rule (see Appendix B.D):
rt = t + yyt + bebe;t + bsbs;t + rfr
f
t + qqt (3.54)
where, the 0js in eqn.(3.54) are calculated parameters indicating interest rate adjustments,
where, a =

c2

1

denotes the adjustment in interest rate due to ination; ay =

(c2y 1)

1

denotes the adjustment in interest rate due to real output gap; abe =


2

1

denotes the ad-
justment in interest rate due to speculative bubbles in the nominal exchange rate; abs =

3

1

denotes the adjustment in interest rate due to speculative bubbles in the nominal
stock price; arf =

5

1

denotes the adjustment in interest rate due to foreign real interest
rate; and aq =

c2q

1

denotes the adjustment in interest rate due to the change in the bilat-
eral real exchange rate (see Appendices B.C and B.D for more on denitions): Eqn.(3.54)
is the reaction function of the central bank and it is known as an extended Taylor rule, aug-
mented to include the central bank's reactions from speculative bubbles, foreign interest
rates and changes in the exchange rate.
The Taylor principle implies that the ination coefcient should exceed the value of
1, to ensure a real interest rate response that will lead to lower ination (Kontonikas and
Montagnoli (2006)). The ination coefcient in the interest rate reaction function a should
be greater than 1 in order to satisfy the stability condition that the real interest rate increases
in response to ination, with higher values implying a more aggressive responses. The
stability condition states that the optimized policy adjustment factor, c2; must be greater
than 
1:This implies that the countercyclical monetary policy response can be effective by
ensuring that the real interest rate increases in response to higher real output gap, lower
stock price bubbles and higher real exchange rate bubbles and vice versa.
The optimal monetary policy rule is highly robust to mispecication because it in-
corporates the probability features of speculative bubbles (see Appendix B.A). Thus, the
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optimality of a monetary policy action depends on the subjective assessments about the
probability of a bubble emerging or busting in the next period (Bordo and Jeanne (2002)).
For example, using the denition for the adjustment in interest rate due to speculative
bubbles in both the nominal stock price and the exchange rate, the effect of the probability
on monetary policy rule is positive. Thus, the effects of the change in probabilities on
coefcients for speculative bubbles in both the stock price and exchange rate depend on
whether the bubble is positive or negative. If the bubble is positive a larger probability
leads to a higher coefcient and as a result , a higher real interest rate. This is consistent
with the intuition that in order to eliminate a positive bubble which is likely to continue to
increase, it is necessary to raise the real interest rate to reduce the real stock price. However,
raising the interest rate also causes the real exchange rate to appreciate, making exports
less competitive. To every policy reaction, both the stock price and the real exchange rate
respond differently, but depends on whether the speculative bubbles is negative or positive
(see Appendix B.B). This is so because it is usually argued that there exists a negative
relationship between the stock price and the interest rate and a positive relationship between
the exchange rate and the interest rate.
3.3 Model Estimation
Based on the structural model, this study tests the null hypothesis that the optimal rule that
includes speculative bubbles does not stabilize an economy better than the one that does
not. The rst step is to conduct unit root tests on all variables in the structural model using
the standard Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) test, the Phillips and Perron (1988) test,
and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) test. We test for unit roots in data
in order not to mispecify the structural model by including variables which do not guarantee
convergence to equilibrium during estimation.
The last column of Table 3.7 gives the order of integration for all the variables. For
some series when the ADF tests and the PP tests differ, I use the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (1992) test. The Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin tests the null hypothe-
sis that the series are stationary. This is done for real interest rate for the United States.
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Table 3.7. Unit Root Tests for the Monetary Model: 1995Q2-2008Q4
Variables ADF Test PP Test IO
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff
y -3.26* -3.49** -2.47 -3.51** I(1)
r -3.38* -7.33** -3.49* -8.28** I(1)
 -3.68** -3.77** I(0)
q -2.47 -5.34** -2.38 -5.37** I(1)
s -0.43 -6.64** -0.59 -6.69** I(1)
rf -2.24 -4.15** -4.05** I(1)
e -2.38 -6.28** -2.34 -6.33** I(1)
be -4.10** -4.21** I(0)
bs -2.92* -8.3** -2.9* -8.91** I(1)
Note: ** =1%; *=5% and ***=10% levels of signicance.
Source:Author
The second step is to estimate the structural model represented in eqns. (3.39)
through (3.44) as a systems regression method. We estimate two structural systems, one
with speculative bubbles and the other without bubbles. The third step is to calculate the
parameters for the optimal monetary policy rule in eqn. (3.54) using estimated parameters
from the structural model. The fourth step is to simulate the variances for ination and real
output gap and compute the loss function.
A simultaneous equation system approach allows for the parameters of various mod-
els in a system to be contemporaneously estimated. Since we are studying a single country,
a preferred econometric method for systems equations which include asset price bubbles
would be ones that account for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the
errors across equations. The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method is ideal for a
single country regression analysis, although for multiple countries, a generalized method
of moments (GMM) can be used. The SUR is also known as the multivariate regression, or
Zellner's method, and has been employed to estimate the parameters of a system in which
the estimators of the cross-covariance matrix are based upon estimators of the unweighted
system.
There are other systems estimation techniques such as the full-information maximum
likelihood (FIML). The FIMLmethod, which according to Meese (1986) does poorly when
the speculative bubbles terms are included in an asset pricing model is not adopted. The
poor performance of maximum likelihood methods has also been highlighted in Filardo
3.4 Empirical Results 68
(2001), among others who also use asset price bubbles in the estimation of the interest rate
rule.
This study's econometric framework follows the Granger representation theorem
(Engel and Granger (1987)) and it accommodates the SUR method for estimating a short-
run structural model. The Granger representation theorem posits that the moving average
autoregressive and error correction representation are connected for cointegrated systems.
Cointegration implies that deviations from equilibrium are stationary, with nite variances,
even though the series themselves are nonstationary and have innite variances.
After estimating the structural model, we calculate the unconditional variances of
ination and real output gap using the same structural model. This thesis assumes three
values for the penalty on the variance of real output gap, y; as: 0.01, 0.5 and 1.5. We
construct graphs depicting Taylor curves by using simulated variances for ination and
real output gap. The idea for doing so is to determine which optimal rule gives the lowest
Taylor curve. The Taylor curve is drawn with variance of ination , 2; on the horizontal
axis and variance of real output gap, y2; on the vertical axis. The Taylor curve can be used
to resolve the decision problem on which monetary policy rule should be adopted:-either
strict ination targeting, or output targeting, or exible ination targeting.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Data Description
The study uses quarterly data between 1995Q2 and 2008Q4. There are two key data
sources: The International Monetary Fund's (2009) International Financial Statistics, Quar-
terly Issues and from the McGregor BFA data buffet website. The study period covers a
single political regime under the African National Congress rule and covers the nancial
crises periods between 1996Q1 and 2008Q4. Key variables for the model are the real gross
domestic product for South Africa; the real short-term interest rates for South Africa (dis-
count rate); Consumer price index for South Africa; the nominal speculative bubbles for
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange all share index (JSEI); nominal speculative bubbles for
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the bilateral nominal exchange rate; real short term interest rate for the United States (Dis-
count Rate) differential, and the bilateral real exchange rate for the United States dollar per
unit of the South African Rand.
3.4.2 Calculating State-dependent Speculative Bubbles
The study uses the following expectational restriction equation under rational bubbles the-
ory to extract speculative bubbles:
bt+1 = ut+1 +  (1 +Rt) bt (3.55)
where,  is initially assumed to be 0.5. Since the speculative bubble begins at zero, eqn.
(3.55) implies that the probability of the bubble emerging in the next period depends on the
probability of having a negative or positive residual. The probability of having a positive or
negative residual is always equal to 0.5. Thus, the speculative bubble in the rst period is
the corresponding residual in that period (Semmler and Zhang (2007)). The proxy for the
discount factor is the market return. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicate the extracted speculative
bubbles for the bilateral nominal exchange rate and the stock price, respectively.
Fig. 4.1- Exchange Rate Bubbles Fig. 4.2- JSE Index Bubbles
Source:Author
The extracted speculative bubbles closely follow the major nancial crisis periods
over the sample period and which is in agreement with Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
Bond (2010). After extraction we then employ Semmler and Zhang (2007) endogenous
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Table 3.8. Parameters for the Estimation of Probability of Bubbles
Parameters Result SZ (2007)
1 0.31 na
2 0.08 na
3 0.34 0.4
4 0.12 0.8
a 15 10
v 1 1
Re1; Re2 time-varying g1 = 0:01; g2 = 3:0
Rs1; Rs2 time-varying
Note: SZ (2007) denotes Semmler and Zhang (2007).
Source:Author
probability model (see Appendix B.A, eqns. (B.9) and (B.10)). The parameters for the
calculation of the probability function are presented in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8 shows the empirical results for the probability functions for each of the two
speculative bubbles, for the whole period. The parameter estimates for the variables used in
simulating probabilities for bubbles measure the effects of bubbles and the interest rate on
the magnitude of probability switching. The size of probability switching, as determined
from the linex function (see Appendix B.A, eqn. (B.14)), is a dependent variable in an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation to determine the parameter values for the
effects of speculative bubbles size and the interest rate on the probability function of the
speculative bubbles. The standard full information maximum likelihood systems regression
method is employed to determine the parameter estimates. The estimated parameters in
Table 3.8 are comparable to those in Semmler and Zhang (2007) and Kent and Lowe (1997)
for industrialized countries.
3.4.3 Parameter Estimation: Structural Model Results
This study calculates the coefcients for the optimal monetary policy rule and investigates
its macroeconomic performance by simulating variances of ination and real output gap.
The study compares an optimal rule with bubbles to the one without bubbles and then
decides which one achieves the best stabilization of real output gap and ination volatility.
Table 3.9 shows that the real interest rate has a larger impact on real output gap
than both the real exchange rate and the real stock price. However, lagged real output gap
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Table 3.9. Structural Model Results (standard errors in parenthesis)
1). Model With Bubbles
Real Output Gap Bilateral Real Exchange Rate
yr =  0:04(0:01) qr = 0:05(0:31)
yy = 0:97
(0:13) qb = 0:08(0:06)
yq =  0:008(0:004) qrf =  0:56(0:32)
ys = 0:007
(0:003)
Ination Real Stock Price
 = 0:63
(0:11) sr = 0:22(0:33)
y = 0:48
(0:21) sy = 0:65(0:18)
q =  0:03(0:009) sb = 0:08(0:09)
2). Model Without Bubbles
Real Output Bilateral Real Exchange Rate
yr =  0:03(0:12) qr = 0:08(0:31)
yy = 0:96
(0:03) qrf =  0:73(0:31)
yq =  0:008(0:004)
ys = 0:007
(0:0004)
Ination Real Stock Price
 = 0:62
(0:08) sr = 0:17(0:32)
y = 0:60
(0:23) sy = 0:68 (0:17)
q =  0:04(0:009)
Note: **, *, and *** denote 1%, 5%and10% levels, respectively.
Source:Author
accounts for the largest variation in real output gap. The comparison of the effects of both
real interest rate and the real exchange rate justies why the interest rate is preferred as
an instrument. Knedlik (2006) gets the similar result from using the monetary conditions
index that the interest rate has a larger effect on real output gap than the real exchange rate.
The study uses the estimated coefcients to determine the adjustment parameters of all the
variables in the optimal monetary policy rule.
Table 3.9 reports the estimated parameters of two types: parameters from a model
with speculative bubbles and without them. Both the real exchange rate and the real stock
price maintain the same coefcients as before, but the impact of the real interest rate falls
when speculative bubbles are excluded. The parameters which determine the Phillips curve
change by increasing the responsiveness of ination to excess demand. The responsiveness
of ination to the exchange rate improves but remains smallest. The real exchange rate
model also shows an increased impact of both the South Africa and United States short
term interest rates. The real stock price model results are mixed with an increased impact
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of real output gap and a decreased impact of real interest rate. The results conrm that the
Blanchard-Tobin effect is a real problem with the real interest rate. The deleterious income
effects of the real exchange rate is also real and is referred to as the Dornbusch effect. On
the other hand, the indirect Mundell effect is a real threat and is represented by the indirect
deleterious effect of ination on real output growth.
3.4.4 Evaluation of Monetary Policy Rules
The study evaluates the optimal monetary policy rules across three sets of central bank
preference choices of weights on the variance of real output gap. Table 3.10 shows the
coefcients for the optimal monetary policy rules and Figures 4.3 and 4.4 and Table 3.11
gives an evaluation of the performance of the optimal rules.
We compute the model's parameters in eqn. (3.54) using the coefcients in Table
3.9. The structure of the optimal monetary policy rule for calculating these parameters is
derived in Appendix B.D. The monetary policy adjustment coefcient is c2. This thesis
assumes three sets of central bank preferences, which are consistent with Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999). The sets of preferences are represented by fy; c2g = f0:01; 1:78g;
f0:05; 1:85g; f1:5; 1:88g); as illustrated in Table 3.10. Additional information at the
bottom of Table 3.10 shows the sample period averages for probability features. The av-
erage growth rate of the stock price bubble over the sample period is 180 percent and its
average decrease rate is -70 percent. The average increase rate of the exchange rate bubble
is 1.6 percent while its average decrease rate is -88 percent.
Table 3.10 shows computed coefcients for the optimal monetary policy rule, in basis
points. The coefcients indicate an aggressive monetary policy. Monetary policy remains
aggressive whether speculative bubbles are included or excluded from the structural model.
However, the central bank responds more aggressively when speculative bubbles are in-
cluded in the optimal monetary policy rule. Although Woodford's (1999:76) result does
not include all the target variables being considered here, his results are consistent with his
ination coefcient of 46.1 in the optimal rule. The conclusion is that targeting real output
gap gives a much more aggressive reaction than targeting ination. Malikane and Semmler
(2008) also conclude that more aggressive response is coming from real output gap.
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Table 3.10. Optimal Rule over Different Preferences
Optimal rule- with bubbles Optimal rule -no bubbles
y 0.01 0.5 1.5 0.01 0.5 1.5
c2 -1.78 -1.85 -1.88 -1.78 -1.85 -1.88
coefcients {in basis points} {in basis points}
 47.05 49.04 49.65 30.13 31.40 31.80
y 48.11 49.06 49.35 34.25 35.02 35.25
bs -0.79 -0.79 -0.79 - - -
be 0.06 0.06 0.06 - - -
f 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.27 0.27 0.27
q -1.41 -1.47 -1.49 -1.21 -1.26 -1.27
Estimated information
s 0.22 e 0.26
Rs1 1.798 Re1 0.016
Rs2 -0.696 Re2 -0.879
Source:Author
As implied by this study's Phillips curve, monetary policy must be aggressive and
preemptive in order to head off ination ahead of time. The reason being that ination ex-
pectations are slow to change. The results show that preemptive monetary policy rule is a
possibility and has support from Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Ball (1998), Kontonikas
and Montagnoli (2006). This study allows the expected probability of the speculative bub-
bles to be estimated in order to inuence the coefcient of the speculative bubbles. The
knowledge about the empirical probability gives power to central banks on when to inu-
ence the evolution of the speculative bubbles. The empirical probability gives information
on the likelihood of a speculative bubble.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 depict the efciency of the optimal monetary policy, by compar-
ing the one with speculative bubbles and another without. The study uses the variances of
ination and real output gap as measures of macroeconomic stability. The Taylor curve
shows that the optimal monetary policy with speculative bubbles is more efcient than the
one without. The optimal rule that excludes speculative bubbles is above that which in-
cludes them. The variances of ination and real output gap are higher for an optimal rule
that excludes speculative bubbles than the one that includes them. Therefore, the central
bank should respond to speculative bubbles. The Taylor curves further indicate that the
macroeconomic effects of responding to the speculative bubbles have stabilizing effects.
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The graphs are drawn as a way of comparing the stabilization effects of the central bank's
reaction function on the variances of ination and real output gap. Each gure compares
an optimal monetary policy rule with speculative bubbles to the one without them.
Fig. 4.3- Performance of the Optimal
rule, y = 0:5
Fig. 4.4- Performance of the Optimal
rule, y = 1:5
Source:Author
Figure 4.3 shows the result for the central bank's preference of a 0.5 weight on the
variance of real output gap. In this case, the optimal rule with the speculative bubbles gives
the lower Taylor curve implying that it has a better performance, especially in the middle
portions of the gure. This result shows that the exible rule would give the lowest vari-
ances for ination and real output gap. Figure 4.4 shows that if the central bank increases
its punishment for volatility of real output gap, the optimal rule with speculative bubbles
out-performs the one without. Basically, the results depicted in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 indi-
cate the same pattern of results that the optimal rule with speculative bubbles will tend to
be superior to the one without bubbles.
The optimal rule with bubbles has a larger stabilization effect than the rule without
bubbles, but Table 3.11 shows that stabilization is achieved at greater loss to welfare. The
results for the objective function of the central bank indicates higher losses for the bubbles
rule across all the three central bank's preferences. Table 3.11 indicates that the statistics
3.5 Conclusions 75
Table 3.11. Performance of the Optimal Rule
Preferences Standard Deviation Objective Function
Rules Implicit y
_

_
y Loss
Bubbles 0.01 0.26 0.001 1.27
No-bubbles 0.01 0.49 0.001 0.24
Bubbles 0.5 0.51 0.01 0.26
No-bubbles 0.5 0.49 0.01 0.24
Bubbles 1.5 0.51 0.01 0.26
No-bubbles 1.5 0.49 0.01 0.24
RW (1997) (0.39) (11.3) (0.93)
Note: RW (1997) denotes Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
Source:Author
for the standard deviations and the objective function are for the whole sample period, as
period averages.
The results in Table 3.11 have empirical support from the literature (Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997)). Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) report values for standard deviations
of ination and real output gap that are less than 1 for ination and their reported value for
the loss function is also less than 1.
This thesis shows that responding to speculative bubbles is better than not respond-
ing to them. This implies that the optimal rule that includes speculative bubbles stabilizes
ination and real output gap better than without them. But the study also shows that sta-
bilization of ination and real output gap variances can be achieved at a greater welfare
loss when responding to speculative bubbles. This is comparable to Semmler and Zhang
(2007) who conclude that responding to speculative bubbles with a zero bound interest rate
is desirable but that there are increasing welfare loss implications associated with it.
3.5 Conclusions
This study develops a dynamic optimal monetary policy rule, which has a role for spec-
ulative bubbles. The objective of the paper has been to determine the effects of the cen-
tral bank's response to speculative bubbles on the macroeconomic performance for South
Africa between 1995Q2 -2008Q4. By estimating an endogenized probability function for
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each of the asset price bubbles, the study incorporates the non-linear effects of economic
booms and recessions in the optimal monetary policy rule, since the endogenous probabil-
ity that enters the model is a non-linear function of interest rate and speculative bubbles.
The model shows that a non-linear combination of the optimal interest rate rule and
speculative bubbles is a possibility with both highly and lowly induced bubbles. Thus, as
the probability of the bubble falls, the speculative bubbles will increase, allowing negative
bubbles to become less and less negative. The possibility of nonlinearity implies the pos-
sible existence of multiple equilibria in nancial asset price models and the existence of
non-linear rules.
The signicance of speculative bubbles in the interest rate rule indicates that the
South African Reserve bank may to some extent have taken into account the nancial
markets imbalances in the past decade. Simulations indicate that the overheating of the
nancial markets can turn out to be good for targeting speculative bubbles because of the
ination and real output gap variance minimization effects. But targeting asset price bub-
bles may not be as loss minimizing as the non- bubble targeting rules. The results suggest
that the monetary policy rule is aggressive and that speculative bubbles should be included
in the optimal monetary policy rule for macroeconomic stabilization reasons. Thus, penal-
izing real output gap is benecial to an economic planner and policy actions that aim at
targeting ination should not ignore imbalances in the nancial markets.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions and Policy Implications
4.1 Conclusions
Chapter 1 formulates the analytical framework for the dynamics in speculative bubbles,
which have a probability of crashing and regenerating, assuming rational expectations.
The rational contagion analytical framework which is developed in this essay employs a
combination of features from Orlean (1989); Lux (1995); Blanchard and Watson (1982)
and Semmler and Zhang (2007). The ndings indicates that speculative bubbles are un-
stable and a permanent feature of asset prices. The instabilities in the speculative bubbles
positively depend on the strength of herd behaviour and whether speculative bubbles are
positive or negative. By implication, the asset price equilibria when speculative bubbles
exist are not sustainable.
The inclusion of the interest rate in the probability function is meant to incorporate
in the contagion model the effect of monetary policy on herd behaviour. The rst essay
analyses the rationality of the contagion of opinions in explaining the dynamic structure of
speculative bubbles. The contagion model has all the three features of the rational behav-
ioural view:- investors' practices, regulatory practices and multiple equilibria.
Chapter 2 measures speculative bubbles in both the stock price and the bilateral nom-
inal exchange rate in South Africa between 1995Q2 and 2008Q4. The computed specu-
lative bubbles have fat tails in their distributions, and these properties are similar to their
asset prices. The study's theoretical basis is grounded in the standard no-arbitrage mod-
els. The stock price model is the standard present value formula, while the exchange rate
model is the uncovered interest parity condition. The essay also shows that the evolution
of speculative bubbles follows a three state process. That is, they can either be negative or
positive or even zero. The tests for the existence of speculative bubbles are done by using
two different cointegration techniques, namely: Engle and Granger (1987) and Phillips and
Ouliaris (1991) cointegration tests. The post-estimation and post extraction phase uses the
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unit roots and the Granger causality tests to justify that the extracted asset price bubbles
are indeed speculative bubbles. The basic idea is that if fundamentals Granger cause asset
prices, then the extracted bubbles would not be speculative bubbles. However, speculative
bubbles can Granger cause fundamental values, as is the case for the stock pricing model.
Chapter 3 derives a dynamic optimal monetary policy rule, which responds to specu-
lative bubbles and fundamentals. The objective of the essay is to compare the performances
of optimal rules which respond to speculative bubbles and those which do not. The essay
incorporates the non-linear effects of economic booms and recessions in the optimal mon-
etary policy rule by using an endogenous probability which is a non-linear function of
interest rate and speculative bubbles.
The analytical framework shows that a non-linear combination of the optimal interest
rate rule and speculative bubbles is a possibility with both highly and lowly induced bub-
bles. Therefore, as the probability of the bubble falls, the speculative bubbles will increase,
allowing negative bubbles to become less and less negative. The possibility of nonlinearity
implies the possible existence of multiple equilibria in nancial asset price models and the
existence of non-linear rules.
The signicance of speculative bubbles in the interest rate rule indicates that the
South African Reserve bank may to some extent have taken into account the nancial mar-
kets imbalances in the past decade. The results suggest that the monetary policy rule is
aggressive and that speculative bubbles should be included in the optimal monetary policy
rule for macroeconomic stabilization reasons.
4.2 Policy Implications
The study posits that there is a strong relationship between the interest rate, bubble size and
the transition probability. For example, as the interest rate increases, the transition proba-
bility for the expected stock price bubbles falls sharply for positive bubbles and increases
less sharply for negative stock bubbles. However, at the same time, an increase in inter-
est rate causes the transition probability for the expected exchange rate bubbles to increase
sharply for positive bubbles and to fall less sharply for negative bubbles. A decrease in
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interest rate tends to give opposite effects on the transition probability for expected specu-
lative bubbles. Estimating the transition probability is useful to the central bank in order to
know when to react to expected speculative bubbles. The change in the transition probabil-
ity due to changes in interest rates posses a major policy challenge. For example, a raise in
the interest rate appreciates the exchange rate and a fall in the transition probability. This
happens because if speculative bubbles are positive, lower interest rates balloons specula-
tive bubbles in stocks. However, an interest rate hike leads to a reduction in the stock prices
and to a buying frenzy.
The use of optimal policy rules, which incorporate both speculative bubbles, does
not discriminate the policy dilemma of choosing between stock price and exchange rate
targeting, since the central bank only has one policy objective of improving macroeconomic
stability. An optimal monetary policy rule that responds to speculative bubbles can achieve
such a policy objective.
The central bank can best achieve both ination targeting and the best compromise
between ination and real output gap stability by engaging in proactive monetary policy
forecasting activities, where the central bank selects the feasible combination of ination
and real output gap projections which minimize the loss function and the corresponding
interest rate and sets the short-term nominal rate accordingly.
In these activities, asset price developments and potential asset price bubbles are
taken on board and responded to the extent that they affect the projections of the target
variables, such as ination and real output gap. Situations can arise when asset price de-
velopments are deemed unsustainable and hence speculative bubbles, and when a future
collapse of speculative bubbles is imminent. If the probability of such a future collapse is
deemed to impact on ination or real output gap projections, the central bank may want
to adjust policy to moderate asset price developments and reduce the probability of future
busts, thereby achieving more preferable ination and real output gap projections.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.ADerivation of the Pure Contagion Model
The time path of the speculative bubble is expressed and conforms to the Master equation
approach (Weidlich and Haag (1983), Lux (1995)):
db
dt
= bv(1 +R)(expfabg)  bv(expf abg) (A.1)
let db
dt
= x ,
x = bv(1 +R)(expfabg)  bv(expf abg) (A.2)
Expanding eqn. (A.2) gives
x = (1 +R) bveab   b v
eab
(A.3)
Using De Moivre's theorem, the Euler's eqn. (A.3) is solved for sinh and cosh function as
(Weidlich and Haag (1983));
x = bv sinh ab cosh ab2v + bv (cosh ab+ sinh ab) (1 +R) (A.4)
= bv (cosh ab+ sinh ab) (1 +R)  b v
cosh ab+ sinh ab
Let x =

b, eqn. (A.4) becomes

b = bv (R + 1) (sinh ab+ cosh ab)  bv (cosh ab+ sinh ab) 1 (A.5)
Applying the De Moivre's rule that:
(cosx+ i sin x)n = cos (nx) + i sin (nx) (A.6)
Eqn. (A.5) becomes:

b = bv (1 +R) (sinh ab+ cosh ab)  bv (  cosh ab  sinh ab) (A.7)
84
A.B Proof of Boundedness of the Endogenous Probability Function 85

b = bv (1 +R) (sinh ab+ cosh ab) + bv (sinh ab+ cosh ab) (A.8)
The mean value for the speculative bubbles follow the standard approach:

b = v [2 +R] (b sinh (ab)  b cosh (ab)) (A.9)
Eqn. (A.9) uses the standard sine-cosine formula which implies that the evolution of the
time path of the speculative bubbles follows the hyperbolic sine and cosine standard ap-
proach. The nal mean value solution is derived using the following standard explicit
mean value formula:
dx
dt
=  [tanh(u)  x] cosh (u) (A.10)
where, u = ab; x = b; = v [2 +R] : Thus, the time path of the speculative bubbles in
eqn.(A.9) can be expressed using tanh as:

b = v [2 +R] (b tanh(ab)  b) cosh (ab) (A.11)
This solution transformation has support from Weidlich and Haag (1983) and Lux (1995).
A.B Proof of Boundedness of the Endogenous Probability
Function
The boundedness property of eqn.(1.16) can be proved by rst taking the derivative of the
probability function, (b) with respect to bubble size, b and then taking limits as bubble
size, b , approaches positive innity and negative innity;
d+ (b)
d (b)
=
d
db
  1
2
tanh(b ) =
1
2
tanh2(b )  1
2
=
1
2 cos2 i(b)
 
cos2 i(b )  1  1
2
=   1
2 cosh2(b)
< 0 (A.12)
Eqn.(A.12) indicates the opposite effects between the probability and the bubbles. We
prove that the probability function is bounded between 0 and 1 by taking the limits on the
probability function and solving as;
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lim
(b )!1
1
2
(1  tanh(b )) = 0 (A.13)
and
lim
(b )! 1
1
2
(1  tanh(b )) = 1 (A.14)
This concludes the proof.
A.CProperties of the Endogenous Probability Function
Semmler and Zhang (2007) assumes that the probability that the speculative bubble will
increase or decrease in the next period can be inuenced by the interest rate, r; and the
size of the speculative bubble, b. Thus, assuming a time varying probability function, the
next period probability function for the speculative bubbles, (b; r )t+1; follows two paths,
which are dened using the endogenous probability function as:
+  (b; r)t+1 =
1
2
(1  tanh (! (bt; rt))) (A.15)
and
 +(b; r)t+1 =
1
2
(1  tanh (# (bt; rt))) (A.16)
where,
! (bt; rt) = 1fo(b)t + 2sign(bt)rt; i > 0 (A.17)
and
# (bt; rt) = 3fp(b)t + 4sign(bt)rt; i < 0 (A.18)
where, + (b)t+1 and   +(b)t+1, are period t+1 probability functions for the optimists and
the pessimists, respectively, and sign(b) is the sign function for bubbles which is specied
as a three state Markov chain process:
sign(b)t =
1; if (b)t > 0
0; if (b)t = 0
 1; if (b)t < 0
(A.19)
where, fo(b) in eqn.(A.17) is the linex function for optimists and fp(b) in eqn. (A.18) is
the linex function for pessimists. The linex function is nonnegative and asymmetric around
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0: Borrowing from Semmler and Zhang (2007), the following is the specication for the
LINEX function as it is found in Varian (1975) and Nobay and Peel (2003):
f(b) = v [expfabg   ab  1] ; v > 0; a 6= 0 (A.20)
where, v scales the function f(b); and a determines the asymmetry of the function f(b): For
analytical purposes, Semmler and Zhang's (2007) specications for v = 1 and a > 0 are
adopted. Applying the standard probability structure for comparative purposes, eqn.(A.20)
gives shape to the probability function for each of the asset price bubbles. The trajectory
of the probability function will be more atter when the bubble is negative than when the
bubble is positive, as long as a is not equal to zero. Furthermore, eqns.(A.15) and (A.16)
indicate the compactness of the probability function (that is, it is bounded between 0 and
1): Using the general eqn.(A.12), the following important properties of the probability
functions for each of the two asset price bubbles are deduced:
d
+  (b; r)t+1
d(b)t
=  1 (expfbt   1g)
2 cosh2(! (bt; rt))
< 0 , 8 (b)t > 0 (A.21)
and
d  +(b; r)t+1
d(b)t
=  3 (expfbt   1g)
2 cosh2(# (bt; rt))
> 0 , 8 (b)t < 0 (A.22)
Eqns. (A.21) and (A.22) indicate that the slope or the rate of change of the probability
function for optimists and pessimists is negative if the bubble is positive and is positive
if the bubble is negative. The probability functions that are dened in eqns. (A.21) and
(A.22) are asymmetric around b = 0: Furthermore, eqns. (A.15) and (A.16) indicate that
the effects of the current bubbles bt on +  (b; r)t+1 and bt on   +(b; r)t+1 , depend on
the sign function, eqn.(A.19) for each bubble (i.e. whether the bubble is optimistically
or pessimistically generated or zero-bubble). This is consistent with both Semmler and
Zhang (2007) and Kent and Lowe (1997). As more traders realize that the bubbles exist,
they become more reluctant to buy the assets. This points in the direction of the effects
of bubbles on the fundamentals. The effect of the bubble on the fundamental is always
negative. Thus, rational traders know that if the bubble is very large, the asset value or
fundamental value will be very low and will be unwilling to buy the asset at that very high
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price and everyone will be stuck with the asset, unless the bubble bursts. The price can
either fall sharply or gradually depending on the nature of the probability function.
A.D Steady State Solution for the Speculative Bubbles
The denition of both the optimistically generated bubbles and the pessimistically gener-
ated bubbles in eqn. (1.19),is included in time varying probability to determine the stability
implications of the growth paths of bubbles

_b

as:
_b = v (2 +R) (tanh(ab)  b)R cosh (ab) (A.23)
Using eqn.(1.3), the law of motion of the social response index is:
bt+1 =

t+1
bt + "t+1   "t+1 (A.24)
!
bt =
t+1

bt+1 (A.25)
Substituting eqn. (A.25) into eqn. (A.23) and dropping time subscripts gives;
_b = v (2 +R)

tanh(a


b

) 


b

R cosh

a


b

(A.26)
Probability switching is determined by 1; 2; 3; 4;strength of infection (a), bubble size
(b); bubble sign (sign (b)), and interest rate (r); and speed of adjustment (v) and are all
factors affecting the social response or contagion in the nancial market. These factors are
implied in eqn. (A.26) (see Appendix A.C). Grouping like terms gives;
_b = (2v +Rv)

tanh(R cosh

a2
2
2
b2

) R cosh

a
2
2
b2

(A.27)
_b = (2v +Rv)
 
tanh(cosh
 
a22b2 2

R)  cosh  a2b2 2R (A.28)
Substituting for the difference of the two probabilities for optimists and pessimists (see
Appendix A.C)
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_b =
" 
tanh(cosh

a
 
1
2
(1  tanh (! (b; r)))  (1  tanh (# (b; r)))2)
  cosh  1
2
(1  tanh (! (b; r)))  (1  tanh (# (b; r)))2
!#
(2v +Rv)
 
ab2 2R

(A.29)
_b = ftanh(cosh
 
a

1
2

(1  tanh ((1fo(b) + 2sign(b)r)))
  (1  tanh (3fp(b) + 4sign(b)r))
2!
)
  cosh

1
2

(1  tanh (1fo(b) + 2sign(b)r))
  (1  tanh (3fp(b) + 4sign(b)r))
2
g
(2v +Rv)
 
ab2 2R

(A.30)
_b = ftanh(cosh a
0BB@12
0BB@

1  tanh

1 (v [expfbg   b  1])
+2sign(b)r

 

1  tanh

3 (v [expf bg   b  1])
+4sign(b)r

1CCA
1CCA
2
)
  cosh 1
2

(1  tanh (1 (v [expfbg   b  1]) + 2sign(b)r))
  (1  tanh (3 (v [expf bg   b  1]) + 4sign(b)r))
2
g
(2v +Rv)
 
ab2 2R

(A.31)
_b = ftanh(cosh a
0BB@12
0BB@

1  tanh

1
 
v

expf  

b
g     

b
  1
+2sign(b)r

 

1  tanh

3
 
v

expf   

b
g     

b
  1
+4sign(b)r

1CCA
1CCA
2
)
  cosh

1
2
  
1  tanh  1  v expf   bg      b  1+ 2sign(b)r   1  tanh  3  v expf    bg      b  1+ 4sign(b)r
2
g
(2v +Rv)
 
ab2 2R

(A.32)
A.E Steady State Solution for the Probability
The time path of the probability function for the combined optimists and pessimists is given
as:
_
+   (b; r)t= + db   +db (A.33)
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_(b; r) =
1
2
((1  tanh (! (b; r)))  (1  tanh (# (b; r))))db (A.34)
Substituting eqns. (A.17) and (A.18) into eqn. (A.34) gives:
_ =
1
2

(1  tanh ((1fo(b) + 2sign(b)r)))
  (1  tanh (3fp(b) + 4sign(b)r))

db (A.35)
_ =
1
2
db  1
2
tanh1fo(b)db 
1
2
tanh2sign(b)rdb
 1
2
db+
1
2
tanh3fp(b)db+
1
2
tanh4sign(b)rdb (A.36)
_ =  1
2
tanh1fo(b)db 
1
2
tanh2sign(b)rdb
+
1
2
tanh3fp(b)db+
1
2
tanh4sign(b)rdb (A.37)
_ =
1
2

tanh

3fp(b) + 4sign(b)r   1fb(b)
 2sign(b)r

db (A.38)
_ =
1
2
(tanh (3fp(b)  1fb(b) + (4   2) sign(b)r))db (A.39)
Let _ = 0, and simplifying gives;
0 =  1
2
1fo(b)db 
1
2
2sign(b)rdb+
1
2
3fp(b)db
+
1
2
4sign(b)rdb (A.40)
0 =  1fo(b)  2sign(b)r + 3fp(b) + 4sign(b)r (A.41)
0 =  1 (v [expfbg   b  1]) + 3 (v [expf bg   b  1]) (A.42)
+4sign(b)r   2sign(b)r
0 =  1v expfbg+ 1bv + 1v + 3v expf bg   3bv   3v
+4sign(b)r   2sign(b)r (A.43)
0 = 3v expf bg   1v expfbg+ 1bv + 1v   3bv   3v
+4sign(b)r   2sign(b)r (A.44)
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Taking logs, we get
0 = ln3 + ln v   b  (ln1 + ln v + b) + ln1
+ ln (+ b+ v + 1v   3 + + b+ v   3 + v)
+ ln4 + ln sign(b)r   ln2 + ln sign(b)r (A.45)
0 =   ln3   2b+ 2 ln a+ 2 ln b+ 4 ln v + ln1 (A.46)
+ ln4 + ln sign(b)r   ln2 + ln sign(b)r
Simplifying and substituting for b
2


b

= 2 ln a+2 ln


b

+4 ln v+ln1 ln2 ln3+ln4+2 ln sign(b)r (A.47)
Eliminating logs and solving for 
 =

2b

2 ln a+ 2 ln
 


b

+ 4 ln v + ln1   ln2   ln3 + ln4
+2 ln sign(b)r

(A.48)
 =

2b

2 ln a+ 2 ln (+ b  ) + 4 ln v + ln1   ln2   ln3
+ ln4 + 2 ln sign(b)r

(A.49)
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.A Evolution of Speculative Bubbles
We specify the law of motion of the evolution of speculative bubbles in the stock price and
the exchange rate using Semmler and Zhang (2007) as follows:
bs;t+1 =

 11 bs;t + ut+1; with probability s
 12 bs;t; with probability 1  s

(B.1)
be;t+1 =

  11 be;t + vt+1; with probability e
  12 be;t; with probability 1  e

(B.2)
where,  11 = (1 +R1;st) denotes a vector of time varying growth factor for stock bub-
bles,   11 = (1 +R1;et) denotes a vector of time varying growth factor for exchange rate
bubbles,  12 = (1 R2;st) denotes a vector of time-varying decrease factors for stock bub-
bles,   12 = (1 R2;e) denotes a vector of time-varying decrease factors for exchange rate
bubbles. R is the market return on the asset and employed as a key determinant of the spec-
ulative bubbles growth or decrease rate (Poterba and Summers (1986:1143) and Cunado et
al. (2005)).  denotes the probability for the bubble to increase and 1   denotes the prob-
ability for the bubble to fall. u; v are the stochastic error terms which drive the speculative
bubbles and are assumed to be driven stochastically by extraneous factors unrelated to the
fundamentals. These error terms are independently and identically distributed noise terms.
The speculative bubbles in eqns.(B.1) and (B.2) seem very realistic since a positive bubble
would imply an overvaluation of the asset price and a negative bubble would imply an un-
dervaluation. Thus, the presence of speculative bubbles imply the presence of asset price
misalignments.
One of the most important motivations for holding speculative assets experiencing
price bubbles is the expectation that the price will continue to rise. The discovery of ratio-
nal bubbles has shown that bubbles can perfectly arise as a result of the investors's having
highly rational attitudes. The most important contribution of the discovery of rational bub-
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bles is that speculation can no longer be considered as something that is necessarily desir-
able from the economic system's efciency point of view, but that speculation can lead to
a complete severing of connections between asset prices and fundamental values.
Since rational agents know the probability function of a bubble emerging, state-
dependent speculative bubbles can be reformulated from eqns.(B.1) and (B.2) following
Semmler and Zhang. This is done by multiplying the respective probabilities to the current
speculative bubble and summing the two equations. The simplied models for each asset
price bubble is given as:
bs;t+1 = st+1 (1 +R1;st) bs;t + ut+1 +
 
1  st+1

(1 R2;st) bs;t (B.3)
where
 
1  st+1

(1 R2st) bst = bst   bstst+1  R2stbst +R2stbstst+1 (B.4)
and
st+1 (1 +R1st) bst = bstst+1 +Rstbstst+1 (B.5)
bs;t+1 = Rstbstst+1 + ut+1 + bst  R2stbst +R2stbstst+1 (B.6)
bs;t+1 =
 
st+1 (R1st +R2st) R2st + 1

bst + ut+1 (B.7)
The the law of motion of the speculative bubble for the exchange rate can also be specied
by applying symmetric rule to give;
be;t+1 =
 
et+1 (R1et +R2et) R2et + 1

bet + vt+1 (B.8)
Eqn.(B.8) denes the evolution of the speculative bubbles in the exchange rate in period
t+1 and eqn.(B.7) denes the evolution of the speculative bubbles in the stock price in
period t+1. Thus, the evolution of the speculative bubble is determined by the growth and
decrease factors of the speculative bubbles, the probabilities of speculative bubble growth
and bust, the current size of the speculative bubble and the stochastic disturbance term,
which captures all other factors that affect speculative bubbles. This study employs these
bubbles because they can interchange their states from being positive to being negative.
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There are two ways of endogenizing the probability function: a linear and a non-
linear approach. Kent and Lowe (1997) takes a linear approach while Semmler and Zhang
(2007) take a nonlinear approach.
We introduce into the optimization problem a nonlinear probability function which
is bounded between 0 and 1, and which indicates the effects of the size of the bubble and
the level of the interest rate on the probability function. This implies that the probability
function can be measured using the following specication as suggested by Semmler and
Zhang:
et+1 =
1
2
(1  tanh (! (be;t; rt))) (B.9)
st+1 =
1
2
(1  tanh (# (bs;t; rt))) (B.10)
with
! (be;t; rt) = 1fbe(be;t) + 2sign(be;t)rt; i > 0 (B.11)
and
# (bst; rt) = 3fbs(bs;t) + 4sign(bs;t)rt; i > 0 (B.12)
where, e;t+1 and s;t+1, are the expected probability functions for the exchange rate bubble
and the stock price bubble, respectively; 1 and 3 denote the effects of bubbles on the
probability and 2 and 4 denote the effects of the interest rate on the probability; and
sign(bit) is the sign function of speculative bubbles and it follows three states as stated
below:
sign(bet) =
1; if bet > 0
0; if bet = 0
 1; if bet < 0
and sign(bst) =
1; if bst > 0
0; if bst = 0
 1; if bst < 0
(B.13)
where, fj(bjt) is the so-called linex function which is nonnegative and asymmetric around
0: Employing Semmler and Zhang, the linex function can be specied by following the
specication in Varian (1975) and Nobay and Peel (2003) as:
f(b) = v [expfabg   ab  1] ; v > 0; a 6= 0 (B.14)
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where, v denotes the speed of infection and scales the linex function f(b); and  denotes
herd behaviour and determines the asymmetry of the function f(b):For analytical purposes,
we adopt Semmler and Zhang's specications for v = 1 and a > 1. By applying the
standard probability structure for comparative purposes, eqn. (B.14) gives shape to the
probability function for each of the asset price bubbles. The probability function trajectory
will be more atter when the bubble is negative than when the bubble is positive, as long
as a is not equal to zero. Therefore, eqn. (B.14) measures the probability switching from
pessimistic market sentiments to optimistic ones (Lux (1995)).
Substituting eqns. (B.11), B.12), B.13), and (B.14) into eqns. (B.9) and B.10) gives:
et+1 =
1
2
(1  tanh (1 (v [expfabg   ab  1]) + 2sign(be;t)rt)) (B.15)
st+1 =
1
2
(1  tanh (3 (v [expfabg   ab  1]) + 4sign(bs;t)rt)) (B.16)
Eqns. (B.15) and (B.16) are the expected probabilities of bubbles increasing in the future
period and depend on the herd behaviour (a), bubble size (b), sign of the speculative bub-
ble, the interest rate (r), the speed of infection (v), the effects of bubbles on probabilities
(1; 3), and the effects of interest rate on probabilities (2; 4).
The nal solutions describing the law of motion for the speculative bubbles in both
the stock price and the exchange rate is solved by substituting eqns. (B.16) and (B.15) into
eqns. (B.7) and (B.8), respectively, to give:
be;t+1 =

1
2
(1  tanh (1 (v [expfabg   ab  1]) + 2sign(be;t)rt))
(R1et +R2et) R2et + 1

bet + vt+1
(B.17)
bs;t+1 =

1
2
(1  tanh (3 (v [expfabg   ab  1]) + 4sign(bs;t)rt))
(R1st +R2st) R2st + 1

bst + ut+1
(B.18)
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B.B Properties of the Probability Function
The probability function has two properties: the effect of speculative bubbles and the inter-
est rate on the probability function depends on whether the bubble is negative or positive.
The theoretical properties of the probability functions for speculative bubbles can be de-
rived in the following manner. By differentiating eqns.(B.9) and (B.10) with respect to the
speculative bubble, the following denes the rst property of the probability function for
each of the two speculative bubbles:
det+1
dbet
=  1a (expfabet   1g)
2 cosh2(! (bet; rt))

< 0 , if bet > 0
> 0 , if bet < 0

(B.19)
and
dst+1
dbst
=  3a (expfabst   1g)
2 cosh2(# (bst; rt))

< 0 , if bst > 0
> 0 , if bst < 0

(B.20)
Eqn. (B.19) indicates that the slope or the rate of change of the probability function for
the exchange rate bubble is negative if the bubble is positive and is positive if the bubble
is negative. The same interpretation applies for the probability function for the stock price
bubble in eqn.(B.20). The probability function that is dened in eqns. (B.9) and (B.10)
is asymmetric around bit = 0: Furthermore, eqns. (B.19) and (B.20) indicate that the
effects of the current speculative bubbles on their respective probabilities, depend on the
sign function. This is consistent with both Semmler and Zhang and Kent and Lowe: As
more traders realize that the bubbles exist, they become more reluctant to buy the assets.
Thus, rational traders know that if the bubble is very large, the asset value or fundamental
value will be very low and will be unwilling to buy the asset at that very high price and
everyone will be stuck with the asset, unless the bubble bursts. This idea is in line with
Semmler and Zhang who argue that the price can either fall sharply or gradually depending
on the nature of the probability function or the strength of herd behaviour :
For example, if the exchange rate bubble is positive, it implies that the probability
function of the bubble will decrease in the next period. Therefore, eqn. (B.19) shows
that the larger the exchange rate bubble the lower the probability that the positive bubble
will increase in the next period. The negative exchange rate bubble is interpreted in the
opposite manner. If the exchange rate bubble is negative, an increase in the bubble implies
that the probability of the bubble will increase in the next period. Thus, as the exchange
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rate depreciates continuously, it gets closer and closer to its lowest point and therefore,
it is more and more likely to appreciate in the future. But we assume that the current
negative exchange rate bubble does not inuence the probability in period one as much
as the positive one because practically, traders might usually be more pessimistic in bear
markets than optimistic in bull markets. Additionally, it is more difcult to activate a
foreign exchange market when it is in recession than hold it down during booms. To a
larger extent, this is what is explained by the linex function in eqn. (B.14). The probability
function is atter when the speculative bubble is negative than when its is positive (Semmler
and Zhang (2007)). A similar analysis can be done for the probability function for the stock
price bubble. Note that the denition for an asset price appreciation is the positive change
and a depreciation is a negative change.
The second property is the effect of the current interest rate on the next period's prob-
ability and can also be studied by taking the partial derivatives of the probability functions
in eqns. (B.9) and (B.10), with respect to the interest rate rt as follows:
de;t+1
drt
=   2sign(bet)
2 cosh2(! (bet; rt))

> 0 , if bet > 0
< 0 , if bet < 0

(B.21)
ds;t+1
drt
=   4sign(bst)
2 cosh2(# (bst; rt))

< 0 , if bst > 0
> 0 , if bst < 0

(B.22)
The rst partial derivative in eqn. (B.21) shows that if the exchange rate bubble is positive
(that is, over-valuation), an increase in the current interest rate, rt , will increase the proba-
bility that the exchange rate bubble will increase in the next period. However, if the bubble
is negative (that is, undervaluation), an increase in the current interest rate, rt; will lower
the probability that the exchange rate bubble will decrease in the next period. In the case
of the stock price bubble, if the bubble is positive, an increase in the interest rate will lower
the probability that the bubble will increase in the next period. If the stock price bubble is
negative, an increase in the current interest rate will increase the probability that the bubble
will decrease in the next period. Thus, the same policy action will lead to different effects
on the probability of the asset price bubble increasing. This is the dilemma policy makers
face. If there are positive asset price bubbles in both markets, either an increase or a de-
crease in the interest rate triggers different reactions in the nancial market: the exchange
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rate bubble is likely to increase (with positive bubbles) while the stock price bubble is likely
to reduce. An ideal nancial market situation is to maintain an undervalued exchange rate
and to have a bubbly stock price, before increasing interest rates. Alternatively, if the cur-
rent exchange rate is overvalued and the stock price is undervalued, then the reduction in
the current interest rate will have similar positive effects in the nancial markets.
The empirical validity of the relationship between the probability function and the
speculative bubbles for the bilateral exchange rate bubbles and the stock price bubbles is
given in Figures 4B1 through 4B4. This enables us check how the estimated probability
functions for speculative bubbles are related to bubble sizes, as predicted by probability
theory. Figures 4B1 and 4B3 conrm the law of motion of the empirical probability func-
tion for the speculative bubbles in the stock price and the exchange rate. The results are
supported by Semmler and Zhang (2007).
Fig. 4B1- bst & t+1; r = 0 Fig. 4B2- rt; bst & t+1
Source : Author Source : Author
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Fig. 4B3- bet & e;t+1; r = 0 Fig. 4B4-rt; bet;& t+1
Source:Author
The empirical probability function is asymmetric and weakly bounded between 0 and
0:5 across speculative bubbles. The theoretical reason for this is grounded in the argument
that since little is known about the signs on the residual process of the asset pricing model
(i.e. the bubble process), economic agents might expect the noise in the bubble process to
be either positive or negative with an equal probability of 0:5: Figures 4B2 and 4B4 are
constructed by allowing the interest rate to vary over time.
The above analysis shows that the interest rate drives the probability function of bub-
bles in the next period and therefore stimulates changes in both the speculative bubbles and
the behaviour of speculative investors. Thus, interest rates can make speculative bubbles to
increase or can be used to bust speculative bubbles.
B.C Compact Form of the Structural Model
Substituting eqns. (3.43) and eqn. (3.44) into eqns. (3.41) and eq. (3.42), respectively,
gives
st =  srrt + syyt + sb
  
s;t+1 (Rs1 +Rs2) Rs2 + 1

bs;t + ut+1

(B.23)
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qt = qr(rt   rft ) + qb
  
e;t+1 (Re1 +Re2) Re2 + 1

be;t + vt+1

(B.24)
given that,
st+1 =
1
2
(1  tanh (3 (v [expfabg   ab  1]) + 4sign(bs;t)rt))
and
et+1 =
1
2
(1  tanh (1 (v [expfabg   ab  1]) + 2sign(be;t)rt))
Substituting eqns. (B.23) and eqn. (B.24) into eqn. (3.39) and the forward looking
IS curve becomes;
yt+1 =
1
1  2
yt   3
1  2
rt +
4
1  2
rft  
5
1  2
be;t +
6
1  2
bs;t + zt+1 (B.25)
where
zt+1 =
1
1  2
("t+1   yqvt+1 + ysut+1) (B.26)
1 = yy; 2 = [yssy] ; 3 = (yr + yqqr + yssr) ; 4 = yq
5 = yqqb
 
e;t+1 (Re1 +Re2) Re2 + 1

; (B.27)
6 =

yssb
 
s;t+1 (Rs1 +Rs2) Rs2 + 1

where, 5 ,6 indicate the effects of the speculative bubbles' endogenous probability func-
tions (see Appendix B.A) on the coefcients of the exchange rate bubble and the stock price
bubble, respectively. Substituting for the endogenous probability functions, the coefcients
on the two speculative bubbles takes the form;
5 = yqqb

1
2
(1  tanh (! (be;t; rt))) (Re1 +Re2) Re2 + 1

(B.28)
6 = yssb

1
2
(1  tanh (# (bs;t; rt))) (Rs1 +Rs2) Rs2 + 1

(B.29)
Taking expectations on eqn. (B.25), yields
Etyt+1 = w1yt   w2rt + w3rft   w4be;t + w5bs;t (B.30)
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where,
w1 =
yy
(1  yssy) ;w2 =
(yr + yqqr + yssr)
(1  yssy) ;w3 =
yq
(1  yssy) ;
w4 =
yqqb
 
1
2
(1  tanh (! (be;t; rt))) (Re1 +Re2) Re2 + 1

(1  yssy) ;
w5 =
yssb
 
1
2
(1  tanh (# (bs;t; rt))) (Rs1 +Rs2) Rs2 + 1

(1  yssy) (B.31)
Substituting eqn. (B.30) into eqn. (B.25) eliminates the expectations in eqn. (B.25) giving;
yt+1 =  1yt    2rt    3be;t +  4bs;t +  5rft + zt+1 (B.32)
where,
 1 = (1 + 2w1) =

yy + yssy

yy
(1  yssy)

;
 2 = (w2 + 3) =

(yr + yqqr + yssr)
(1  yssy) + (yr + yqqr + yssr)

;
 3 = (w4 + 5) =
yqqb
 
1
2
(1  tanh (! (be;t; rt))) (Re1 +Re2) Re2 + 1

(1  yssy)
+yqqb

1
2
(1  tanh (! (be;t; rt))) (Re1 +Re2) Re2 + 1

; (B.33)
 4 = (w5 + 6) =
yssb
 
1
2
(1  tanh (# (bs;t; rt))) (Rs1 +Rs2) Rs2 + 1

(1  yssy)
+yssb

1
2
(1  tanh (# (bs;t; rt))) (Rs1 +Rs2) Rs2 + 1

;
 5 = (w3 + 4) =

yq
(1  yssy) + yq

We dene 't of the control variable of the central bank as t and yt are predetermined and
rt is chosen
't =  1yt    2rt    3be;t +  4bs;t +  5rft (B.34)
Therefore, the original structural model eqns. (3.39)-(3.44) can be compactly written as
yt+1 = 't + zt+1 (B.35)
t+1 = kt + t+1 (B.36)
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where,
kt =  (L)t + yyt   qqt (B.37)
Eqn. (B.37) is the state variable at time t.
B.D Derivation of the Optimal Rule
We employ the optimization method in Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006). Assuming that
the central bank's intertemporal quadratic loss function L, penalizes both real output gap
and ination volatility, its job is to minimize the loss function:
min
1
2
Et
1X
t=1
tL;  2 (0; 1) (B.38)
where,
L = 2t + yy
2
t =

kt + t+1
2
+ y ['t + zt+1]
2

(B.39)
Subject to
kt+1 = t+1 + yyt+1   qqt+1
, kt+1 = kt + y't   qqt+1 + t+1 (B.40)
where, the ination coefcient is equal to one,  (L) = 1; t+1 = t+1 + yzt+1 is a
Gaussian process. y2 is the variance of real output gap, 2t is the variance of ination, y 
0 is the penalty on output gap stabilization. 0 <  < 1 is a discount factor. Eqn. (B.40)
indicates the law of motion of the state variable. The implication for having eqns.(3.45)
and 3.46) is that as both the interest rate and consequently output 't, are chosen, the only
state variable is ination kt: Thus, the value function, V (kt); is the expected value of the
policymaker's loss function if 't+i is set optimally. The value function is dened in terms
of the state variable, kt:
We use the Bellman's dynamic programming principle. We substitute the two con-
straints, eqns.(3.45) and (3.46) into the value function to obtain;
V (kt) = min
't
Etf1
2

kt + t+1
2
+ y ['t + zt+1]
2

+ V (kt+1)g (B.41)
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The rst-order condition that yields the optimal response is given as:
@V (kt)
@'t
= 0, y't + yEtV 0
 
kt + y't   qqt+1 + t+1

= 0 (B.42)
In order to derive an expression for EtV 0(kt+1) in eqn.(B.42), we use the envelop theorem:
dV (kt) = Et
@
@kt
f1
2

kt + t+1
2
+ y
1
2
['t + zt+1]
2 (B.43)
+V
 
kt + y't   qqt+1 + t+1
gdkt
V 0(kt)dkt = Et

kt + EtV
0  kt + y't   qqt+1 + t+1 dkt (B.44)
V 0(kt) = kt + EtV 0
 
kt + y't   qqt+1 + t+1

(B.45)
Multiplying eqn.(B.45) by y we obtain;
yV
0(kt) = ykt + yEtV 0
 
kt + y't   qqt+1 + t+1

(B.46)
Adding eqn.(B.46) to eqn.(B.42) gives;
0 = y't + yEtV
0  kt + y't   qqt+1 + t+1+ yV 0(kt)
 ykt   yEtV 0
 
kt + y't   qqt+1 + t+1

(B.47)
Simplifying eqn. (B.47) gives eqns. (B.48) and (B.49):
y't + yV
0(kt) = ykt (B.48)
V 0(kt) = kt  

y
y

't (B.49)
Eqn.(B.49) implies that
EtV
0(kt+1) = Et [kt+1] 

y
y

Et't+1 (B.50)
Substituting for Et [kt+1] from eqn.(B.40) into eqn.(B.50) yields;
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EtV
0(kt+1) = kt + y't  

y
y

Et't+1 (B.51)
Substituting eqn.(B.51) back into the rst order condition yields;
y't + y

kt + y't  

y
y

Et't+1

= 0 (B.52)
or
't =  
 
y
y + (y)
2 
!
kt +
 
y
y + (y)
2 
!
Et't+1 (B.53)
When policy is set at time t, kt summarizes the state, so the optimal policy, given the
linear-quadratic structure, will be of the form;
, 't = ckt (B.54)
which implies that
Et

't+1

= cEt [kt+1] = c ((1 + yc) kt) (B.55)
Using the optimal policy condition eqn.(B.54), eqn. (B.53) becomes
ckt =  
 
y
y + (y)
2 
!
kt +
 
y
y + (y)
2 
!
c (1 + yc) kt (B.56)
where, eqn.(B.56) shows what the central bank's policy rule implies concerning interest
rates. A quadratic equation for c can be derived from eqn.(B.56);
yyc
2    y   y + 2y c  y = 0 (B.57)
Eqn.(B.57) is consistent with Kontonikas andMontagnoli (2006). The solutions to eqn.(B.57)
are:
c1 =
1
2
 
2y (  1)
yy
+
y
yy
p
4y
!
(B.58)
c2 =
1
2
 
2y (  1)
yy
  y
yy
p
4y
!
(B.59)
To determine which of these solutions to accept, note that
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kt+1 = kt + y't = (1 + yc)kt (B.60)
so that kt+1 is a stable process if and only if c < 0 so that 1 + yc < 1: We are looking
for a negative solution for c. First, by multiplying c1c2;we nd a negative solution and we
conclude that one of the equations is negative. Since the requirement for optimal solutions
is a negative value for c; we nd that c2, is the negative value. The standard optimal policy
rule can be written as:
't = c2kt (B.61)
't =
"
1
2
 
2y (  1)
yy
  y
yy
p
4y
!#
kt (B.62)
Eqn.(B.62) determines the optimal policy rule. Therefore, the statement that 'tequals c2kt
is used to solve for the optimal interest rate rule:
 1yt    2rt    3be;t +  4bs;t +  5rft
=  c2 (t + yyt   qqt) (B.63)
Collecting like terms together, gives
  2rt    3be;t +  4bs;t =   5rft    1yt   c2 (t + yyt   qqt) (B.64)
The left-hand side becomes
  2rt  

1
2
(1  tanh (! (be;t; rt))) (Re1 +Re2) Re2 + 1


1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yqqb] be;t
+

1
2
(1  tanh (# (bs;t; rt))) (Rs1 +Rs2) Rs2 + 1

(B.65)
1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yssb] bs;t
Using denitions from Appendix B.A for (! (be;t; rt)) and (# (bs;t; rt)) and substituting
back into eqn. (B.65) gives
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  2rt  

1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yqqb] be;t (Re1 +Re2)
1
2
tanh2sign(be;t)rt
 

(Re1 +Re2)

1
2
  1
2
tanh1fbe(be;t)

 Re2 + 1

1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yqqb] be;t
+

1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yssb] bs;t (Rs1 +Rs2)
1
2
tanh4sign(bs;t)rt (B.66)
+

(Rs1 +Rs2)

1
2
  1
2
tanh3fbs(bs;t)

 Rs2 + 1

1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yssb] bs;t
Collecting like terms gives;
 
0@  2 +  1(1 yssy) + 1 [yqqb] be;t (Re1 +Re2) 12 tanh2sign(be;t)
 

1
(1 yssy) + 1

[yssb] bs;t (Rs1 +Rs2)
1
2
tanh4sign(bs;t)
1A rt (B.67)
 

(Re1 +Re2)
1
2
(1  tanh1fbe(be;t)) Re2 + 1

1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yqqb] be;t
+

(Rs1 +Rs2)
1
2
(1  tanh3fbs(bs;t)) Rs2 + 1

1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yssb] bs;t
This simplies to:
 

 2 +

1
(1  yssy) + 1

1
2

[yqqb] be;t (Re1 +Re2) tanh2sign(be;t)
  [yssb] bs;t (Rs1 +Rs2) tanh4sign(bs;t)

rt
 

(Re1 +Re2)
1
2
(1  tanh1fbe(be;t)) Re2 + 1

1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yqqb]

be;t
+

(Rs1 +Rs2)
1
2
(1  tanh3fbs(bs;t)) Rs2 + 1

1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yssb]

bs;t
(B.68)
Let

1 =

 2 +

1
(1  yssy) + 1

1
2

[yqqb] be;t (Re1 +Re2) tanh2sign(be;t)
  [yssb] bs;t (Rs1 +Rs2) tanh4sign(bs;t)


2 =

(Re1 +Re2)
1
2
(1  tanh1fbe(be;t)) Re2 + 1

1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yqqb]


3 =

(Rs1 +Rs2)
1
2
(1  tanh3fbs(bs;t)) Rs2 + 1

1
(1  yssy) + 1

[yssb]

(B.69)
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Then, the left hand side solution is given as;
 
1rt   
2bet + 
3bst (B.70)
Substituting eqn. (B.70) into the left hand side of eqn. (B.64) gives;
 
1rt   
2bet + 
3bst =   5rft    1yt   c2t + c2yyt   c2qqt (B.71)
The solution for the optimal rule is obtained from eqn. (B.71) as:
rt =

c2

1

t 

(c2y    1)

1

yt 


2

1

bet+


3

1

bst+

c2q

1

qt+

 5

1

rft
(B.72)
In shorter notation, eqn. (B.72) becomes:
rt = t   yyt + bebe;t   bsbs;t + rfrft + qqt (B.73)
where, qt = qt   qt 1 denotes change in the real exchange rate, where, the alphas in
eqn.(B.73) are indicators of interest rate weights on optimal policy rule drivers, where,
a =

c2

1

denotes interest rate weight on ination; ay =

(c2y 1)

1

denotes interest
rate weight on real output gap,; abe =


2

1

denotes interest rate weight on nominal ex-
change rate bubbles; abs =


3

1

denotes interest weight on nominal stock price bubbles;
arf =

5

1

denotes interest weight on foreign real interest rate; and aq =

c2q

1

denotes
interest rate weight on the change in the bilateral real exchange rate:
